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ABSTRACT 
 
KATRINA NOWAK DUSEK: Negotiated or Stolen?  Methods of Transition and 
Patterns of Opposition-Regime Interaction in Communist Eastern Europe 
(Under the direction of Dr. Milada Vachudova) 
 
 
 During the 1989-1990 transitions from communism in Eastern Europe, what 
propelled some communist regimes to negotiate with opposition groups, and what 
allowed others to dictate the terms of regime change?  I argue that the variation in pre-
transition interaction between opposition and regime affected the timing and method of 
transition from communist rule.  Specifically, I develop a model for pre-transition 
interaction which I call the “mobilization-liberalization” cycle.  Five case studies 
demonstrate that in countries with mild regime atmospheres, patterns of interaction 
developed that resulted in mature oppositions.  These countries experienced negotiated 
transitions with democratic trajectories. Conversely, this thesis shows that in countries 
with severe regime atmospheres, such patterns did not develop and consequently no 
mature opposition existed.  In these cases, the regimes were able to dictate the terms of 
transition, and the path to democratic consolidation was compromised.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………...........vii 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………viii 
LIST OF TIMELINES…………………………………………………………………......ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ………………………………………………………..….....x 
INTRODUCTION……………………………...……………..……………………………1 
 I-1 Explaining Concepts and Theory …………………..………………..……….11 
            I-2 Case Studies, Data Analysis, Roadmap………………..………………...…….17 
Chapter 
1.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE…………………………………………………………..22 
            1.1 Pre-Transition…………………………………………………………..…......23 
            1.2 Trajectory……………………………………….……………………..……...28 
2.  HUNGARY: NEGOTIATION AND THE STORY OF THE ELITE………………...33 
            2.1 The Regime………………………………..……………………………….....34 
            2.2 The Opposition…………………………………..…………………………....40 
            2.3 Transition: Leading up to the Roundtable……………………………….…….41 
 2.4 Event Data Analysis…………………………….…………...…………….…..43 
 2.5 Summary…………………………………….………………………………48 
  
v 
3.  POLAND: NEGOTIATION THE STORY OF THE OPPOSITION………………….50 
            3.1 The Regime………………………………………………………………….51 
3.2 The Opposition……………………………………………………………....57 
            3.3 Transition……………………………………………………………………...61 
3.4 Event Data Analysis…………………………………………………….…..…64 
            3.5 Summary………………………………….………………………….…..….72 
4.  CZECHOSLOVAKIA: NEITHER NEGOTIATED NOR STOLEN……….……….74 
 4.1 The Regime after 1968………………………………………….………...…77 
 4.2 The Opposition……………………………………………….………...……79 
 4.3 Revolution and Transition……………………………………….……...…...82 
 4.4 Event Data Analysis………………………………….……………………...85 
 4.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………....93 
5.  BULGARIA: THE STOLEN TRANSITION…………………….………………….95 
 5.1 The Regime…………………………………………………………….……96 
 5.2 The Opposition…………..………………………………….……………...100 
            5.3 Transition…………………………………………………….…………….....103 
            5.4 Event Data Analysis…………………………………….………………….104 
 5.5 Summary……………….…………………………………………………….109 
6. ROMANIA: THE STOLEN REVOLUTION………………………………….……...111 
6.1 The Regime and Political Decay ……………………………………….…...112 
  6.2 Popular Resistance…………………………….………...………………...116 
             6.3 Revolution…………………………………………………………………...118 
             6.4 Event Data Analysis…………………………………………………………119 
  
vi 
  6.5 Summary…………………………….…………………………………….123 
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….…………..124 
APPENDIX A:  COMPARISON OF MOBILIZATION AND  
REPRESSION EVENTS…………………………………………………………130 
 
APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY: PROCESS OF ORGANIZING EVENT  
DATA AND MULTIPLE-DATE ENTRIES……..……………..……………..131 
 
APPENDIX C: METHODOLOGY: PROCESS OF RE-CODING EVENT DATA…...132 
APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGY: CRITERIA FOR SELECTING EVENT  
 DATA TO BE INCLUDED IN THIS THESIS………………………………..133 
 
APPENDIX E:  POLISH STATISTICS 1980-1981……….…………………………..134 
REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table I-1 Regime Atmosphere and Tier Rating…………………….………………..18 
Table 2-1 Regime Atmosphere Rating, Hungary……………………………….........34 
Table 2-2 Timeline of Major Liberalizing Concessions granted by MSZMP…….….39 
Table 2-3 Mobilization Growth 1980-1990, Hungary.……………...………….…….45 
Table 3-1 Regime Atmosphere Rating, Poland………………………………………51 
Table 3-2 Mobilization Growth February 1988 to January 1989, Poland……………68 
Table 4-1 Regime Atmosphere Rating, Czechoslovakia……………………………..74 
Table 4-2 Mobilization Growth 1980-1990, Czechoslovakia………………………..87 
Table 5-1 Regime Atmosphere Rating, Bulgaria…………………………………….96 
Table 5-2 Mobilization Growth 1980-1990, Bulgaria………………………………105 
Table 6-1 Regime Atmosphere Rating, Romania…………………………………...112 
Table 6-2 Challenges to the Romanian Regime…………………………………….117 
Table 6-3 Mobilization Growth 1980-1990, Romania……………………………...121 
Table A-1 Mobilization and Repression Events across Five Case Studies………….130 
Table A-2 Mobilization, Repression and Concession in Poland, 1980-1981……….134 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure I-1 Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle Model…………..……………………...6 
Figure I-2 Contributors to Regime Strength……………..…………………………...15 
Figure 2-1       Hungary: Events of Interaction per Year………………………………….44 
Figure 3-1 May 1988 Events, Poland…………………………………………………70 
Figure 3-2 August 1988 Events, Poland………………………………………………70 
Figure 3-3 November 1988 Events, Poland…………………………………………...71 
Figure 4-1 Total Events and Charter 77 Events, 1987-1989………………………….88 
Figure 4-2 Interaction Events Involving Charter 77…………………………………..89 
Figure 4-3 Average Number of Participants per Mobilization Event,  
Czechoslovakia 1987-1989 ……………………………………………….90 
 
Figure 5-1 Bulgaria: Events per Year, 1984-1989…………………………………...107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
LIST OF TIMELINES 
 
Timeline 2-1 Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Hungary, 1988-1989……………..46 
Timeline 3-1 Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Poland, 1988……………………...64 
Timeline 4-1   Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Czechoslovakia, 1989…………….92 
Timeline 5-1 Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Bulgaria, 1989-1990……………...107 
Timeline 6-1 Timeline of Events in Romania, December 1989…...……………….....119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BCP:  Bulgarian Communist Party 
EKA:  Opposition Roundtable (Hungary) 
MDF:  Hungarian Democratic Forum 
MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
MSZP:  Hungarian Socialist Party 
NSF:  National Salvation Front (Romania) 
PRON: Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (Poland) 
RCP:  Romanian Communist Party 
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats (Hungary) 
UDF:  United Democratic Forces (Bulgaria) 
VONS: Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted (Czechoslovakia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe took the world by surprise.  While the 
political environment of the region had long been the subject of intense study, analysis and 
prediction, scholars were caught unaware by the events of 1989.  The transitions were 
surprising in three major ways:  they were mostly peaceful, they occurred in rapid succession 
and, although they were interdependent, each was a consequence of the dynamic interaction 
between regimes and oppositions.  
 The characteristics of each pre-transition phase set individual countries on different 
trajectories.  Some would quickly progress toward consolidated democracies; others would 
embark on indirect paths to forming a stabilized government.  The circumstances that 
brought a country to the point of transition very much affected the outcome of the transition.  
For this reason, an investigation into the developments that influenced the timing and method 
of each country’s transition becomes important in making sense of the divergent paths they 
would subsequently follow.  What drove some regimes to negotiate with opposition forces 
while others could dictate the terms of transition? 
 Scholars have identified international and domestic factors that help explain variation 
in the timing and method of transition away from communist rule.  The international scene is 
an obvious place to search for factors that can explain the different characteristics and 
outcomes of regime change.  However, external influence from both the East and West was 
similar for each transition country.  In April of 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev changed the course
  
2 
of Soviet history by publicly acknowledging a new brand of foreign policy that would later 
become known as the “Sinatra Doctrine” for suggesting that each country could make 
independent choices: 
First and foremost we proceed from the premise that the entire system of the 
socialist countries’ political relation can and must be built on the basis of 
equality and mutual responsibility.  No one has the right to claim special 
status in the socialist world.  We consider the independence of every party, its 
responsibility to the people of its own country, and its right to decide the 
question of the country’s development to be unconditional principles1. 
 
This policy effectively rendered obsolete the Brezhnev Doctrine, which the Soviet Union had 
previously used to maintain influence on its East European satellites.  The impact of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine never left the collective memory of the Eastern bloc population and 
affected their behavior toward the regime:  “But it was only that: the constraint, a dam placed 
against pressing waters…The change in the Soviet Union did not propel transformations… 
what it did was remove the crucial factor that had been blocking them”2.  Once the 
international constraint of Soviet foreign policy had been eliminated, the communist regimes 
across Eastern Europe were weakened, and opposition movements were potentially given 
more space in which to grow.    
As influences from the East affected each transition country in a similar way, Western 
influences also cannot explain variation in domestic outcomes.  While the West supported 
regime change, the various oppositions received no assurances of aid from Western 
governments.  The pressures seen from the outside have a similar effect on all of the 
countries in question.  This similarity cannot solve the question of variation.   
                                                 
1
 As quoted in: Gedmin, J. 1992, The Hidden Hand: Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany, AEI Press, 
Washington, DC. (20) 
 
2
 Przeworski, A. 1991, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Cambridge University Press, New York. (5)  
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What domestic factors then, can account for the variation that is seen in the timing 
and method of a transition?  I argue that oppositions and regimes interacted differently in 
East and East Central European countries and these dynamics account for the characteristics 
of each transition.  The effectiveness of pre-transition interaction to the opposition influenced 
the variation in timing and method.  Pre-transition interaction is defined as the ways in which 
opposition groups respond to regime weakening and the ways in which regimes respond to 
mobilization.   
The effectiveness of pre-transition interaction refers to whether or not the interaction 
between the regime and the opposition made the opposition stronger.  I propose a 
“mobilization-liberalization cycle” that models opposition reaction to regime destabilization 
and the resulting counter-responses.  The catalyst for a mobilization-liberalization cycle is a 
destabilizing event that weakens the unity and/or legitimacy of the regime3.  This cycle of 
interaction models a process of strategic response, where the opposition perceives that the 
regime has become destabilized and may choose to respond through mobilization.  The 
chosen response of the opposition group is a strategic decision based on their experience of 
previous regime response and the perceived capability of the regime to counter-respond to 
mobilization with repression at that moment in time.   
Should an opposition opt to mobilize in response to regime destabilization, the regime 
is faced with the need to counter-respond.  If the regime decides that the cost to repress the 
movement is too high, it may choose to offer concessions through a liberalizing act in order 
to acquiesce to the demands of the opposition.  The consequence of this action to the regime 
                                                 
3
 I define the components of stability as unity and legitimacy (see pages 21-22).  A regime is destabilized when 
it loses unity, through events such as regime splitting, or legitimacy, through failures in policy or ideological 
contradictions.  Often, losses of legitimacy and unity are related.  The individual case studies will show a 
variety of paths to regime destabilization.   
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is a further increase in the cost of repression because the example has been set that the 
response to this level of mobilization is concession.  However, the regime has calculated that 
a liberalizing response is the best strategy to stay in power.   
In this scenario, the opposition achieves a success that contributes to its legitimacy 
and its unity.  Because the regime chose to respond with no repression, the cost to associate 
with the opposition has been lowered, and the opposition movement will gain momentum 
through increased membership.  Legitimacy is gained because the opposition has challenged 
the regime and gained concessions.  If the regime does not respond to the mobilization event, 
the resultant effect is similar to an act of concession.  The regime has demonstrated that it 
will not repress, indicating that the cost of repression is too high.     
If at any point in the cycle the regime has demonstrated that the cost of repression is 
within tolerable limits, it will repress the mobilization.  The cycle of mobilization-
liberalization is ended when the regime demonstrates that it can successfully repress the 
mobilization event.  A new catalyst of regime destabilization is needed to re-initiate the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle.  An example of this scenario is the repression of the 
Solidarity movement in Poland.  By declaring martial law, the Polish regime ended the 
ongoing mobilization-liberalization cycle and demonstrated its ability to repress the 
opposition.   
While the purpose of this thesis is not to explain why regimes offer concessions, but 
rather to investigate the effects of these concessions, some discussion of regime choice is 
warranted.  The strategy of the regime is to opt for the response that best preserves their 
position of power.  When the regime becomes destabilized, the opposition strategically 
chooses whether or not to challenge this instability.  The regime also recognizes its instability 
  
5 
and may opt to provide concessions as a way to maintain their position of power.  The regime 
calculates that the concession offered will assuage the opposition and that they will end their 
mobilization.  The best strategy for the regime is one that pacifies the opposition during times 
of regime instability.  The optimal strategy for the opposition is one that challenges the 
regime during times of instability and weakness.  The history of opposition-regime 
interaction and the regime atmosphere for each transition country affects the strategy and 
level of risk each side is willing to undertake.   
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Oppositions that experienced mild regime atmospheres or oppositions that were not 
habitually and completely repressed were able to challenge regimes more successfully over 
the course of a mobilization-liberalization cycle.  I define regime atmosphere as the 
accumulation of the effects of previous regime actions.  The timing of transition is correlated 
with the strength of the opposition: transitions in countries with comparatively mild regime 
atmospheres occurred earlier.  A mild regime atmosphere created a scenario where an 
opposition could gain enough strength to challenge the ability of the regime to maintain 
power.  These transitions provided an example for other regional opposition groups, but it 
will be seen that the severe regime atmospheres in these countries inhibited the development 
of a mobilization-liberalization cycle, and therefore the growth of cohesive oppositions.   
Transitions in countries with the most severe regime atmospheres therefore, occurred 
later.  Oppositions were generally weak and immature, and the regime was able to preempt 
transitions that favored the opposition and a democratic trajectory.  The international 
demonstration effect influenced both oppositions and regimes, and cannot be ignored in cases 
of later transition. The nascent opposition groups in the later transition cases desired change 
and were inspired by other regional transitions, but lacked the strength and organized 
structure to topple a regime.  Furthermore, they lacked the legitimacy traditionally acquired 
through repeated interaction with the regime, and were unprepared to participate in 
government.  The elites, well aware of the fate of their neighboring regimes, were able to 
maintain power under the guise of democratization, and effectively “steal” the transition 
from adolescent oppositions.  
While understanding the relationship between regime atmosphere and variance in 
timing is important, it is only part of the greater causal puzzle.  Delving further into the 
  
 
8 
relationship between regime atmosphere and opposition capability, it becomes obvious that 
the timing of the initial regime change is only a symptom of an underlying process.  The goal 
of any authoritarian regime is to maintain its monopoly of power such that any rising 
opposition can be systematically eliminated, thus maintaining the status quo and maximizing 
the duration of the regime4.  If we accept that the goal of the regime is to maintain its power, 
then there must be some explanation that illuminates why some East European communist 
regimes willingly negotiated a transition with opposition groups, and knowingly accepted a 
loss of power.  The ability of opposition groups to develop and challenge the regime through 
mobilization plays heavily into the decision to transfer power, and answers the question of 
why some regimes were able to thwart opposition attempts to challenge power.  The puzzle 
therefore is not solely explaining variation in timing, but more importantly to investigate the 
recent history of regime-opposition interaction to explain the method of transition.  Why in 
some cases were the elites forced to negotiate and why in others were they able to “steal” the 
transition from the opposition and embark on a pseudo-democratic trajectory?    
Negotiating a transfer of power serves a strategic purpose for the regime.  An 
opposition group whose perceived strength approaches that of the regime’s, poses a career-
ending threat to the regime.    If the regime calculates that it does not have the capability to 
assume the cost of fully repressing a threatening opposition, it may strategically choose to 
negotiate a transition of power.  Under these circumstances, the regime may view a 
negotiated transition as its best method of maintaining some semblance of authority in the 
ensuing government.   A regime therefore, may opt to negotiate a transfer of power when it a 
                                                 
4
 Swaminathan, S. 1999, “Time, Power, and Democratic Transitions”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 
43, no 2, pp. 178-191. (179) 
  
 
9 
faces an opposition whose increasing strength threatens the ability of the regime to maintain 
power.   
A negotiation may not always have a positive result for the opposition.  A regime 
may opt to bargain as a method to preempt the mature growth of the opposition.  In such a 
transaction, the regime stands to retain a large portion of its power.  Because of this, the post-
transition trajectory is often undemocratic.  In the case of Eastern Europe, opposition groups 
learned about the power of independent movements through the international demonstration 
effect.  The example of other transitions however, also demonstrated to the regimes the 
consequences of negotiating with a mature opposition.  This led some regimes in later 
transitions to strategically preempt the completing of a mobilization-liberalization cycle by 
offering to transition away from communism.  In these cases, the regime maintained an 
overwhelming majority of its power because the immature oppositions were not unified and 
were unprepared to successfully negotiate to achieve democratic change.  Because in these 
cases the opposition was marginalized, it is not a true negotiation.  Even though the regime 
may have termed the transition process as a “roundtable”, the opposition had little or no sway 
in determining the outcome.  For this reason, while some scholars will term such transitions 
as “negotiated transitions”, I will refer to them as “stolen transitions”.    
For each country, the ability of an opposition to mature is a function of the pattern of 
interaction that I call the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  The continuation of the cycle 
favors the opposition groups because it increases the cost to the regime to repress.  I propose 
that the variation seen in the results of each transition are a product of the nature of the 
liberalization-mobilization cycles in each country.  I argue that cycles which start earlier and 
gain momentum slowly over an extended period of time are more likely to result in a 
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transition where the opposition forces the regime to negotiate a transfer of power.   This is 
because over the course of prolonged interaction, the opposition group gains unity and 
legitimacy for achieving concessions in successive confrontations with the regime.  
Protracted cycles are usually seen in countries with relatively mild regime atmospheres.   
This thesis will also demonstrate that in some cases, an opposition can gain maturity 
through variations of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  In this example, the opposition 
continues to mobilize despite consistent repression.  It is able to do so because the regime 
incompletely or inconsistently represses mobilization.  Because the movement is not fully 
repressed, the opposition continues to confront the regime and is consequently matured 
through this modified mobilization-liberalization cycle.  The model stipulates that the cost of 
repression must be met in order to end the cycle.  Regimes that did not meet the costs to fully 
repress contributed to the maturing of the opposition by allowing for their continued activity.  
I will also show that cycles which are initiated later and gain momentum most quickly 
are more likely to result in stolen transitions which favor the regime.  In cases where short-
lived mobilization-liberalization cycles succeeded in overwhelming the communist regime, 
the undeveloped opposition could not effectively elicit a favorable transition from the regime.  
In these cases, mobilization momentum is gained through unorganized mass demonstration, 
and is not orchestrated by an opposition with coherent goals.  Due to the regime atmosphere 
in these countries, the elites are in a better position to enact repression throughout the pre-
transition period, which contributes to the inability of an opposition to gain strength.  
Countries which adopt this cycle of interaction are countries with comparatively severe 
regime atmospheres with a high tolerance for the cost of repression.   
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The lack of strength of the opposition in these cases leads to examples of stolen 
transitions, where the regime is able to dictate the conditions of change.  The cycle of 
mobilization-liberalization is prematurely halted by the pretense of a liberalizing act.  In 
these cases, the undeveloped opposition is marginalized and they must wait for the 
destabilization of the new regime in order to begin a new mobilization-liberalization cycle.   
The following section will describe several key concepts that I have introduced, and 
provide a review of key arguments in the literature on transitions.  After providing this 
background, I will present five case studies.  I will use event data from the European Protest 
and Coercion Event Data5 dataset to illustrate the existence or absence of complete 
mobilization-liberalization cycles in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and 
Romania.  I then will discuss how the variation in patterns of interaction led to differences in 
post-transition trajectory.   
 
Explaining Concepts and Theory 
Why did communist elites choose to negotiate with oppositions in some countries, but 
not in others?  In order to explain different opposition-regime interactions, I must first define 
key terms associated with my model.  The first is the concept of regime atmosphere, which I 
use to represent a regime’s historical record of responding to internal confrontation.  Regime 
atmosphere is the accumulation of the effects of previous actions, and I use it purposefully to 
measure levels of repression within a society from the time the major internal processes 
toward transition begin to occur through the time of the roundtable negotiations.  A regime 
atmosphere also encompasses the constraints placed on society such as censorship, the ability 
                                                 
5
 Francisco, R.A. European Protest and Coercion Data.  (http://www.web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/) 
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to travel, and other civil liberties.  As much as regime atmosphere affects the ability of 
society to maneuver, it also affects the outlook of the regime.  Comparatively mild regime 
atmospheres were overseen by comparatively liberal regimes, as the affects of liberties and 
modernization extended to the regime as well as the population. I use Freedom House scores 
combined with a rating from the Political Terror Scale6 to provide a numeric assessment of 
regime atmosphere. This combined scoring method allows me to classify the severity of 
regime atmosphere within each of my case studies.    
Charles Tilly uses a similar term, regime environment, to define mechanisms that 
generate alterations in public politics, inequality, and networks of trust7.  Although using a 
comparable term, I am attempting solely to define the accumulation of effects on a 
population based on its experience under a regime, and how these effects in turn influence 
aspects of opposition and regime interaction.  I do not apply this term to future alterations of 
the relationship, but to the situation during the pre-transition phase.  I define this phase from 
1987 to 1989, because all mobilization-liberalization cycles begin during this time.   In 
defining the term as such, I relegate it to one specific moment in time, thus allowing it to 
encompass the entire status quo for a chronological point of reference.  In addition, the 
broadness of the term allows me to encompass several other relevant factors.   
 The way in which a regime has historically responded to internal confrontation has a 
monumental effect on the ability of an opposition to grow.  In cases of severe regime 
atmosphere where repression does not allow for the growth of opposition movements, the 
                                                 
6
 The Political Terror Scale is a yearly measure of political violence and terror.  The scale is based on a 5-point 
“terror scale” developed by Freedom House.  The data for the current scale is compiled from the Amnesty 
International annual country reports and the U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices:  Gibney, M., Cornett, L. and Wood, R.  http://www.politicalterrorscale.org.   
 
7
 Tilly, C. 2000, “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization”, Sociological Theory, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-16. 
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interaction between opposition and regime is going to be less intense and less frequent (but 
not less significant to the greater story).  Conversely, a comparatively mild regime 
atmosphere may allow for political space in which an opposition can mobilize.  This scenario 
creates the opportunity for increasingly effective regime-opposition interaction.  The 
differences in regime atmosphere thus are key elements to explaining the variance seen in 
East European transitions. 
 Regime atmosphere also encompasses the concept of “strength”, which is a term I use 
to describe the combined effect of legitimacy and unity of both regime and opposition groups.  
The Gurr-Lichbach component “organizational strength” provides a definition of strength 
that represents the size, cohesiveness, and coercive capability of each group.  Their model 
also stipulates that the organizational strength of challenging groups is determined relative to 
the strength of opponents, and cannot be independently assessed8.  My use of the term 
strength will follow the guidelines specified in the Gurr-Lichbach model9, with an emphasis 
on the unity and legitimacy of the opposition and the regime.  To determine the increasing 
strength of an opposition, I will present the size of opposition movements as a ratio of 
number of participants to total population.    
 I also will frequently use the term “stability” to describe the state of the opposition or 
the regime, a term which is related to, but not interchangeable with strength.  Stability refers 
to the degree of legitimacy or unity.  Unity is simply a measure of a group’s cohesiveness.  
High degrees of unity and legitimacy correspond with a more stable entity.  Obviously, 
                                                 
8
 As stated in Francisco, R.A. 1993, “Theories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989”, American Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 663-680.  (669-670)  
 
9
 The Gurr-Lichbach model is explained thoroughly in: Gurr, T.R. & Lichbach, M.I. 1979, “Forecasting 
Domestic and Political Conflict” in To Augur Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics, eds. J.D. 
Singer and M. Wallace, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, pp. 153-194. 
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declining legitimacy negatively affects the strength of a regime or opposition, because it 
indicates instability.   
For the purposes of this thesis, legitimacy is identified by historical record.  In the 
case of the opposition, legitimacy is determined by its previous record of gaining concessions 
or achieving a response of incomplete repression.  These responses add to a record of 
legitimacy because they show the ability of the opposition to elicit responses that reveal the 
inability or unwillingness of the regime to fully repress a mobilization.  They therefore 
demonstrate the opposition’s strength because the regime perceives the cost to repress the 
opposition to be high.  The ability of an opposition to gain legitimacy is again closely related 
to regime atmosphere: in cases of sustained and severe regime atmospheres, the opposition 
had difficulty gaining legitimacy as it lacks a recent record on which to base its legitimate 
existence.  The regime also uses its historical record to justify its legitimate claim to power.  
Much of its legitimacy is based on the willingness of the population to “accept” the 
ideologies upon which the regime is based.  In using the term “accept”, I am referring to the 
opposition’s level of reluctance to challenge the ideology, which is again a function of the 
severity of the regime atmosphere.   
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FIGURE I-2:  Regime Strength  
 
  
The second major concept I use is cost of repression, which is taken from Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy10.  I 
use it in the same terms as they present it: the cost to the elite to engage in repression11.  The 
cost of repression is based on the ability of the elite to repress and the subsequent strength of 
the opposition.  A regime that is weakened due to loss of unity or legitimacy experiences a 
higher cost of repression, and likewise a regime that faces a stronger opposition also has a 
higher cost to repress this movement.  I will argue that the effects of decreasing strength lead 
to increasing opposition capability, and therefore produce a cumulative effect in the 
increasing cost of repression to the regime.  
 The last concepts I will describe are perceived power, which I use to describe the 
state of the regime or the opposition and perceived capability which I use to depict the 
capacity of one group to response to the other.  These concepts are important because they 
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relate the likelihood of both a regime’s decision to repress and an opposition’s decision to 
challenge.   The decision for an opposition to mobilize is based on prior regime atmosphere 
(and thus the likelihood of a repressive response) and temporal perception of their own 
capabilities and of the power of the regime.  The opposition will act at a time when it weighs 
its capabilities against to the perceived power of the regime, and judges a likely chance for 
achieving a concession in the form of a liberalizing act.  In addition, the regime will choose 
its response based on its perception of opposition power.  
 This thesis investigates the characteristics of opposition-regime interaction in East 
European communist countries to understand the relationship between the pre-transition 
phase and post-transition trajectories.  The elements that make up the pre-transition 
environment directly affect the method of transition, and therefore the characteristics of the 
resulting government.  I am primarily investigating the variation in pre-transition factors that 
drove some communist regimes to negotiate with opposition groups and others to dictate the 
terms of transition.     
The following case studies will show that countries with comparatively mild regime 
atmospheres are most likely to support the mechanisms of the mobilization-liberalization 
cycle, because the regime has a record of offering liberalizing concessions, of failing to fully 
suppress mobilization, or of neglecting to respond to mobilization.   These responses increase 
the cost of repression.  An opposition that experiences a protracted mobilization-
liberalization cycle is better prepared to achieve a negotiated transition with a democratic 
trajectory.  The method of transition is influenced by the combination of regime atmosphere, 
development of a mobilization-liberalization cycle, opposition maturity and regime strategy 
for maintaining power.  These influences are all intricately related.    
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Countries with severe regime atmospheres did not provide the setting for completed 
mobilization-liberalization cycles.  Oppositions that did not benefit from protracted 
mobilization-liberalization cycles were at a disadvantage in eliciting favorable transitions, 
because the opposition movement lacked maturity and legitimacy, and the cost to repress 
remained low.  Countries with these pre-transition characteristics were more likely to 
experience stolen transitions.  The ensuing government was comprised of many elements of 
the former regime, and led the country on an indirect trajectory to consolidated democracy.  
The characteristics of pre-transition interaction between oppositions and communist regimes 
affect the likelihood of democratic trajectories.  Therefore, investigating the variation in pre-
transition interaction is fundamental to understanding the subsequent political paths of each 
country.    
 
Case Studies, Data Analysis, Roadmap   
In this thesis I will present five case studies: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.  Together these cases will illustrate the different outcomes that have 
been generated through variations of the mobilization-liberalization cycle described above.  
My cases will show countries with a wide range of regime atmosphere scores, as derived 
from a combination of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings and the 
Political Terror Scale  The chart below illustrates the range in case study regime atmosphere 
and the respective post-transition trajectory rating.  
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TABLE I-1:  Regime Atmosphere and Tier Rating  
 
Pre-Transition Regime Atmosphere 
Score 
1987-198912 
Post-Transition 
Trajectory 
Rating 
Freedom 
House13 
Political Terror 
Scale14 
Average 
Score 
 
PR15 CL16 AI17 State18  
 
Hungary 4.67 3.67 1.67 1.67 11.67 Tier 1 
Poland 4.67 4.33 2.33 2.33 13.67 Tier 1 
Czechoslovakia 6.67 6.00 2.67 3.00 18.33 Tier 2 
Bulgaria 7.00 7.00 3.00 3.00 20.00 Tier 3 
Romania 7.00 7.00 3.00 3.33 20.33 Tier 3 
 
The trajectory rating is a score from Tier 1 to Tier  3, based on the immediate post-transition 
outlook for each country.  A score of “1” indicates that the regime negotiated with a mature 
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opposition.  The trajectory for these countries is toward a consolidated democracy.  A score 
of “3” indicates that the transition was stolen from an immature opposition during the course 
of the roundtable sessions and elections.  The chart shows that these countries had the most 
severe regime atmospheres in the pre-transition phase.   The immediate trajectory for these 
countries is a renewed authoritarian regime.  A score of 2 indicates that the country shares 
characteristics from countries with a score of 1, but also shares elements with a country that 
earned a rating of 3.  Czechoslovakia is a 2nd tier country because its immediate post-
transition trajectory is toward a consolidated democracy.  The severity of its pre-transition 
regime atmosphere, however, indicates that consolidated democracy is not a likely outcome.  
The Czechoslovakia case study summary will show that a modified mobilization-
liberalization cycle produced a mature opposition despite the severity of regime atmosphere.     
 Since the fall of these regimes, an abundance of research has been devoted to 
describing these transitions, and I will use the findings of this research to support my concept 
of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  The main purpose of this literature to my thesis is to 
provide an accurate account of regime atmosphere and opposition capability during the pre-
transition years.   After providing relevant background information for each country, I will 
use empirical data from Dr. Ronald A.  Francisco’s European Protest and Coercion19 
database to illustrate the processes of interaction taking place in each of my case studies.  
This dataset is a compilation of worldwide news sources that report events of protest and 
coercion from 1980 to 1995, and thus provide an excellent source of opposition-regime 
interaction.  While this dataset can by no means provide a completely accurate account of 
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each and every event of mobilization or coercion, I believe that it shows the necessary trends 
from which I can conclude that patterns of mobilization-liberalization are in fact taking place.   
 Many different factors affect the robustness of news source event data.  As will be 
seen in the case studies, the amount of reported events from each country varies.  This is due, 
in part, to the regime atmosphere of each country.  The political restrictions present in each 
country affected the flow of information and the ability of foreign media to make reports.  In 
addition, because the media is driven by interest, countries which attracted more international 
attention were more likely to have a higher incidence of protest and coercion events.  Despite 
these shortcomings, event data which is compiled under consistent methodology is still 
considered to be an important and viable source of protest and coercion events20. 
The data is vital to representing the patterns of interaction that transpired in each 
country.  I have assembled all pertinent events21 within the dataset and re-coded them 
according to their role in the pre-transition phase of each country.  In the case of the 
oppositions, I compiled all pertinent events of mobilization and divided them into cases of 
opposition mobilization and opposition de-mobilization.  I applied similar logic to the cases 
of regime action, coding each elite event as either an act of concession or an act of repression.  
By organizing the events in this manner, I was able to discern patterns of interaction that 
developed between the opposition and the regime prior to transition.  In case studies with 
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favorable democratic trajectories, variations of mobilization-liberalization cycles developed, 
and could be traced back to one main catalyst event.  Conversely, the case studies that 
revealed short and incomplete cycles developed more divergent trajectories toward a 
democratic government.   
Much of this thesis will focus on transition theory.  Therefore it is essential to provide 
a brief review of the existing prominent transition theory in order to highlight how the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle of interaction can contribute to understanding the timing 
and method of negotiated transitions from communism.  After providing this review, I will 
examine each of my case studies in order of their regime atmosphere ranking. It will be seen 
that mild regime atmospheres were present in early cases of transition.  These countries 
developed protracted mobilization-liberalization cycles, mature oppositions, and resulted in 
transitions that favored democratic trajectories.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1:  A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 The existing literature on transitions from authoritarian regimes is vast and includes 
decades of analysis on the ways in which regimes interact with rising oppositions groups.  
These analyses attempt to identify and correlate variation in the pre-transition, transition, and 
trajectory characteristics among countries that have transitioned from authoritarian regimes.  
The main bodies of literature that exist on transitology stem from three basic approaches to 
explaining transitional change:  sweeping overviews that cast recent transition as a global 
trend toward democratization, transitology comparisons which create links between the 
transitions of Latin America and Southern Europe to communist Europe, and works focusing 
on comparing pre and post-communist societies to understand why these regimes collapsed22.  
This thesis falls into the third category of comparison, as I am attempting to identify patterns 
in pre-transition interaction that affect the method and trajectory of transition.   
 However, because there is such an immense body of prominent literature that 
discusses this same topic, I must properly insert my research into this ever-growing body so 
that it can be understood in the greater context.  The focus of my study is on the pre-
transition period in Eastern Europe.  This stage of transition encompasses several of the 
topics that are relevant to the mobilization-liberalization model: regime atmosphere, regime 
destabilization, and mobilization.  I will devote the first section of this review to discussing 
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these factors as pre-transition elements, and evaluate my ideas against the conclusions of 
prominent scholars.   
 While the parameters of this thesis do not explicitly extend into the trajectory phase 
of transition, trajectory is an underlying theme because the characteristics of pre-transition 
dictate trajectory23.  Understanding the dynamics of pre-transition allows for the 
interpretation of the events that take place after transition, and this is the main contribution of 
this work.  Two main topics must be delineated as they relate to the trajectory phase of 
transition:  power and duration of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  The second section 
of this review will discuss these topics as they pertain to trajectory. 
 
Pre-Transition 
 The main reason for studying the pre-transition stage is to understand the path that 
each country followed after the change in power.  The mobilization-liberalization cycle 
shows how the dynamics of pre-transition interaction dictate later events.  This relationship is 
widely accepted among transitology scholars: “…historical factors are critical in shaping the 
resources and especially the preferences of elites during the transition, as well as, more 
generally, transition trajectories”24.  Many scholars differ in their opinions of what had the 
greatest impact: historical factors or processes.  M. Steven Fish asserts that the processes 
outweigh historical factors: “Political struggles, actions and choices that took place during 
and after the onset of transition…are more important than legacies for determining variation 
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in trajectories of democratization”25. In my model these two factors are inexplicable.  While 
the process (the mobilization-liberalization cycle) is the main factor that ultimately has the 
greatest effect on transition method and trajectory, the historical regime atmosphere dictates 
the characteristics of the cycle.  For this reason, I cannot separate the concepts of history and 
mechanism.    
The historical factor that I heavily emphasize is regime atmosphere.  This pre-
transition factor is surprisingly user-friendly in the East European case studies, as compared 
to Latin American and South European cases.  The events in Eastern Europe in 1989 were 
unique to other periods of transition from authoritarian rule because the legitimacy and 
methods of rule for each regime was founded in communist ideology.  This is an important 
similarity because a common scale of regime atmosphere can be developed and universally 
applied to Eastern European case studies.  This is a unique tool of analysis that allows a 
direct comparison between a calibrated regime severity and pre-transition mobilization 
characteristics.   
The first mechanism of the mobilization-liberalization cycle is the catalyst: 
destabilization.  The most common form of destabilization is a regime split.  Many 
transitology scholars agree that the splitting of the elite is almost always the main underlying 
cause for regime change26.   Many factors are incorporated into why a regime becomes 
disconnected.  This is not a theme that I directly engage in my case studies, so I will take a 
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few moments here to provide insight on regime splitting from the existing transitory 
literature.   
Grzegorz Ekiert identifies many processes that are incorporated into what he 
identifies as a “transitory phase”27, three of which describe events that caused destabilization 
in Eastern Europe.  The first is the deterioration of ideology, which created an identity crisis 
within the communist parties.  As the foundation of rule and legitimacy crumbled, the parties 
became less unified.  The second is the failure of the centrally planned economies.  
Economic crisis was a fundamental reason for regime split across Eastern Europe, as will be 
seen in the case studies.  Lastly, the disappearance of international restraints played a large 
role in regime splitting.  The reforms of the Soviet Union contributed largely to the de-
legitimization of East European communist regimes.  Without the foundation provided by the 
ideology and the Soviet support that had historically bolstered weakening regimes, the 
communist parties of Eastern Europe were vulnerable to softliner politicians who actively 
sought reform.   
As was illustrated above, the conditions that caused the fragmentation of the elite 
challenged regime legitimacy.  Adam Przeworski provides a pertinent explanation of 
legitimacy that articulates its relationship to regime collapse.  He asserts that legitimacy is 
not the “source of the dynamic of regime change”28.  In essence, legitimacy is not necessarily 
required for a regime to maintain its authority.  If no other options for governance are 
available then legitimacy is negligible, because there is no realistic alternative to the status 
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quo29.  However, legitimacy is intricately related to the story of East European transitions, 
because the destabilization caused by a lack of legitimacy created new opportunities and new 
possibilities in the eyes of the population.  Once a destabilizing catalyst initiated the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, the alternatives to the status quo became apparent and an 
opposition grew and aggressively sought a new alternative.  I quote a passage from Russell 
Bova to illustrate this point:  
 Unpopular regimes can maintain their domination of society through 
repression that makes the cost of opposition very high, thus making the 
possibility of significant change seem remote…With the onset of 
liberalization, however, not only do the costs and risks of opposition begin to 
fall but alternatives to the status quo ante that once seemed impossible now 
appear to be in the realm of possibility30 
 
Stability offered through legitimacy was essential to the survival of communist regimes.  The 
advent of reforms in the wake of the loss of legitimacy created an opening that was quickly 
infiltrated by organization from below. 
Reform is always a dangerous undertaking for authoritarian regimes, because reforms 
create the opportunity for political alternatives.  The mobilization-liberalization cycle clearly 
illustrates this trend.  Any form of increased liberalization decreases the regime’s 
concentration of power.  The inherent danger in the mobilization-liberalization cycle is that 
as regimes opt to liberalize, the cost of repression increases.  This means that the cost to 
associate with the opposition is decreased.  Even more precarious to the regime is when the 
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forces of mobilization are strong enough that the concessions offered have a de jure existence, 
and thus are legally official and binding for the future31.   
Mobilization in response to political opening is made possible through civil society.  
The discussion on civil society could logically end here, except that the existence of a civil 
society is fundamentally at odds with communist ideology.  A major unforeseen event in East 
European transitions was that the overwhelming force and the main actor in transitions from 
communism was the opposition32.  
This creates a tricky point:  how were regimes toppled by a movement from within 
society if no autonomous civil organization was permitted?  This is where the effects of 
regime atmosphere and the subsequent likelihood of opposition development logically meet.  
The mobilization-liberalization cycle is perpetuated in countries with comparatively more 
lenient regime atmospheres.  This means that the constraints on civil society are weaker.  
Oppositions emerge more readily in these situations and successfully drive the mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  The outcome of such cycles of interaction was more favorable to the 
opposition.  The support for this conclusion is well documented: “A striking pattern appeared, 
in which transitions seemed to be conducted by negotiation if the old regime was no longer 
unified and if organizations in society had begun to exert autonomy”33 , although a 
comparable pattern of opposition-regime interaction has yet to be added to the literature on 
elements of the pre-transition phase. 
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Trajectory 
Understanding the trajectories of post-communist transitions is vital to understanding 
the dynamics in the region today.  The two concepts that I discuss in this thesis that are 
associated with trajectory are power and the duration of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  
These concepts are the legacy of pre-transition interaction.  The degree and direction of 
power differentiation at the point of transition has an enormous effect on the subsequent 
trajectory.  The duration of the mobilization-liberalization cycle dictates the extent of power 
held by either the opposition or the regime, and therefore I am discussing duration as part of 
the trajectory and not as part of the pre-transition phase.  Each case study country included in 
this thesis experienced a roundtable session. Because each country experienced a roundtable, 
I refer to the transitions as negotiations.  Obviously, the utility of these negotiations largely 
varies and is a product of pre-transition factors.      
 My model of interaction shows that transitions that were negotiated in favor of the 
opposition groups occurred in situations where the opposition held the more powerful 
position.  This conclusion is not supported by traditional transition literature based on the 
Latin American experiences.  Scholars have argued that in the Latin American cases, 
transitions that resulted in democratic trajectories were negotiated when parity existed 
between the opposition and the regime.  As the negotiations went forward, the oppositions 
mobilized in response to its perceived gains, and the regime negotiated to forestall the event 
of mobilization34. 
 The literature on Latin American cases cannot be universally applied to East 
European cases.  While it is true that in many East European cases the opposition continued 
                                                 
34
 Swaminathan, S. (1999:178-191)  
 
  
 
29 
to gain strength and capability during the negotiations, the event of negotiation was the 
culmination of challenges already mounted by the opposition.  East European literature 
follows the theory outlined by my model.  Negotiations are most likely to lead to democracy 
when a power differentiation existed that favored the opposition: “…it was situations of 
unequal distribution of power that produced the quickest and most stable transitions from 
communist rule.  In countries with asymmetrical balances of power, it was the ideological 
orientation of the more powerful party that largely determined the type of regime to 
emerge”35.  This scenario is depicted by the mobilization-liberalization model.  In cases 
where the communists held the greater position of power, regimes emerged that resembled 
new authoritarian regimes, whereas in cases where the opposition held the upper hand, 
democratic ideals were more likely to prevail.   
 It logically follows that the discussion of power is intricately related to the duration of 
the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  In a protracted cycle, the opposition has the luxury of 
consolidating ideas over time and coalescing around defined ideals.  In cases of protracted 
cycles of interaction, the opposition groups had the most favorable transition because they 
held the greatest position of power.  Therefore, their trajectories should result in democracy 
at a higher rate than rapid mass mobilization, and the ideals of such oppositions should play a 
large role in determining the characteristics of the resulting government.  This indeed will be 
seen to be the case.   
 But what of cases where the mobilization-liberalization cycle is not clearly developed 
and has a short lifespan?  These are the cases I refer to as stolen transitions.  In these cases, 
the opposition mobilizes rapidly and is not coalesced under a defined set of goals to achieve 
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through mobilization.  In addition, the regime quickly dissolves and while some leaders are 
ousted, lesser ranking officials from the communist party often fill their shoes.  The new 
leaders stop the full development of the mobilization-liberalization cycle and assume 
leadership under the guise of reform.  While the new leaders hold de facto power, they are 
inherently weak.  Cases from Latin American and Southern Europe also model this trend: 
“These studies clearly suggest that a rapid decomposition of state power…is hardly 
conducive to the establishment of viable democratic regimes”36.  The Tier 3 cases presented 
in this thesis show a similar tendency for non-democratic trajectories.   
 Just as a protracted mobilization-liberalization cycle proved to be effective for the 
opposition, it also had benefits for members of the regime who embraced reform.  
Communists who initiated reforms over time in the pre-transition period were better prepared 
for the advent of transition37.  When transitions occurred quickly and without a period of 
preparation (accomplished through the mobilization-liberalization cycle), a void of political 
power was created: “…the swift disintegration of one-party states has left a dangerous 
political vacuum, setting in motion an often chaotic process of political change”38.  Former 
communists filled these voids, but had little legitimacy under which to claim them.   
 Until now I have neglected the forces of ethnic nationalism in my discussion of East 
European transitions.  Nationalism is a prevalent force that guided the trajectories of many 
East European countries, most notably those who lacked a defined pre-transition 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, and therefore had neither a regime nor an opposition that 
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was prepared to assume leadership.  The void of political legitimacy was filled in many cases 
by former communists “who were able to use ethnic nationalism to forge new political 
identity and thereby convince electorates that they were legitimate participants in the new 
democratic party”39.  The discussion of ethnic nationalism is crucial to understanding how 
the trajectories of each country were forged.  However, while the forces of nationalism were 
undoubtedly present in the pre-transition phase, it is largely a discussion for post-transition 
scholars, and will not play a major role in the development of various mobilization-
liberalization cycles.   
Because nationalist forces were prominent in many of my case studies, but were 
noticeably absent in others, I have removed all mobilization and repression events that were 
generated by ethnic nationalism.  I did this in order to isolate mobilization against the regime 
from mobilization (and potential regime reaction) that was motivated by ethnic tensions.  The 
purpose of my study is to show mobilization against the regime and subsequent regime 
reaction.  By removing ethnic nationalism events, I eliminate potential mobilizations and 
reactions that are not representative of the dynamics encompassed in the mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  Studying ethnic nationalism is vital to understanding East European 
post-communist trajectories, but because it distorts the nature of the statistical data of 
mobilization and repression, I will not include of nationalism in the pre-transition discussions 
of my case studies. 
The importance of power and duration of the mobilization-liberalization cycle are 
clearly seen in the trajectory phase of transition.  This section summarized prominent 
literature relating to the phases of transition, and allowed me to incorporate my model into 
the existing transitology scholarship.  The following sections will present five case studies 
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and discuss the pre-transition factors that contributed to the development of a unique 
mobilization-liberalization cycle.   
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 2:  HUNGARY, NEGOTIATION AND THE STORY OF THE ELITE 
 
 The case of Hungary shows a mild regime atmosphere that permitted the development 
of a protracted mobilization-liberalization cycle. The consequences of such a cycle were a 
mature opposition, a negotiated transition, and a democratic trajectory.  The lenient regime 
atmosphere that predominated in the 1980s developed due to an unstable regime.  Failed 
economic policy and a declining standard of living led to tensions within the regime and 
resulted in hardliner and reform factions. As a result of this weakening, the regime offered 
concessions as a strategy to maintain power.  The strategy ultimately failed, as such 
liberalizing acts allowed political space for opposition groups.  While opposition activity 
occurred throughout the 1980s, a cohesive movement developed late in Hungary.  The largest 
spike in activity occurred after the resignation of János Kádár, which signaled the instability 
of the regime and triggered the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Without an aggressive 
Soviet foreign policy to reinforce the Hungarian regime, the communists were ultimately 
forced to negotiate a transition with the opposition as a final strategy to maintain influence.  
 Table 2-1 depicts the regime atmosphere in Hungary prior to transition.  The regime 
atmosphere score of 11.67 is an average score derived from Freedom House and the Political 
Terror Scale.  Of the five case studies investigated in this thesis, Hungary has the mildest 
regime atmosphere in the pre-transition phase40.  Hungary’s roundtable sessions were held 
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from 13 June 1989 to 18 Sept 198941, and were chronologically the second of such 
negotiations to take place.   
 
TABLE 2-1:  Regime Atmosphere Rating, Hungary42  
 
Freedom House Political Terror Scale 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Amnesty 
International 
U.S. Dept of 
State 
Total 
Score 
1987 5 4 2 2 13 
1988 5 4 2 2 13 
1989 4 3 1 1 9 
Average 3-
Year Score: 
11.67 
 
 
The Regime 
Long before an opposition movement capable of negotiating a transfer of power 
developed, changes within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) began to 
reduce the strength of the party.  The deterioration of the economy was a major source of 
friction within the MSZMP, and over time served to divide the regime.  In an attempt to 
assuage the developing economic crisis, MSZMP General Secretary János Kádár introduced 
a policy of “speeding up” the economy between 1985 and 1987, the result of which was 
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increased foreign debt and chaos among the divided leadership43.  The dire situation of the 
economy was a major factor in polarizing the party into hardliner and reformed-communist 
factions.  The political softliners desired a semi-constitutional system that would in turn 
improve the living conditions of Hungarians while still affording the MSZMP substantial 
political influence44.  Many of the reformed communists would eventually support the 
opposition movement, and would propel the post-transition trajectory toward a consolidated 
democracy.    
The disunity of the elite destabilized the authoritarian regime and directly affected its 
legitimacy.  After the 1956 Revolution, János Kádár had come to power under what has been 
termed a “surrogate” legitimacy45, based on his ability to restore government function.  
Kádár’s inability to normalize the economic crisis led to his replacement in 1988 by Karoly 
Grosz46.  As a result of this change of leadership, any legitimacy associated with the Kádár 
regime was now in jeopardy.   
As will be shown in the event data analysis, there is a sharp increase in mobilization 
following the resignation of Kádár.  The regime’s lack of ability to repress this mobilization 
led to liberalizing concessions and thus set the mobilization-liberalization cycle into motion.  
While this event can clearly be seen as the catalyst to the cycle, the preconditions to this 
event are also significant in determining the utility of the cycle to the opposition. 
                                                 
43
 Lach, J. 2006, “The Political Economy in Hungary through Transition” in The Political Economy of 
Transition in Eurasia: Democratization and Economic Liberalization in a Global Economy, eds. N. Graham & 
F. Lindahl, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing.  (199)  
 
44
 Lach, J. (2006:199)  
 
45
 Kis, J. 1995, “Between Reform and Revolution: Three Hypotheses About the Nature of the Regime Change” 
in Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94, eds. B.K. Kiraly & A. Bozoki, Atlantic Research and Publications, 
Highland Lakes, New Jersey, pp. 33-60. (44)  
 
46
 Lach, J. (2006:199)  
 
  
 
36 
 Two main events in the 1980s exposed the declining legitimacy of the MSZMP and 
simultaneously revealed the growing strength of organized opposition to the regime.  In 1987 
and 1988 there began outbreaks of protest over the Bos-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam 
project47, a “late Stalinist ‘gigantomaniac’ investment venture”48, with harmful 
environmental consequences.  The government of Hungary was unable to quell public 
discussion or repress movements against the dam, and eventually brought the question to the 
parliament.  The parliament voted largely in favor to continue the dam, revealing that 
although previous legislative reform authorized semi-competitive elections, the parliament 
was still not the voice of the people, but the voice of the MSZMP49.   
 The second major event that solidified the end of legitimacy for the MSZMP was the 
rehabilitation of historical figures from the 1956 Revolution.  In the summer of 1988, a 
liberalizing act known as the Freedom of the Press Movement50 allowed for public discussion 
of events such as the 1956 uprising.  Because the official version of the uprising was so 
closely associated with the legitimacy of the MSZMP, allowing debate threatened the 
stability of the regime.  The reburial of Imre Nagy and his associates was a large momentum 
swing in the favor of the opposition, because it offered political legitimacy to the movement 
of the 1950s, and allowed new opposition groups to claim authority based on their 
connection to this historic movement. 
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The legitimacy of the opposition was intensified through a comment released by 
regime softliner and politburo member, Imre Pozsgay, who stated that the 1956 Revolution 
was a “popular uprising”.  This directly contrasted the official government term for the event: 
“counter-revolution”51.  It provided the opposition with a legacy that they could inherit to 
reinforce their own legitimacy. 
 By January of 1989, it became clear that the MSZMP as a single party could no 
longer control the growing forces that challenged its hold on power.  It had no plan for 
continuance and no social legitimacy.  The reform wing of the MSZMP gained strength and 
overpowered hardliners within the party.  In addition, “reform circles” of disillusioned party 
members began forming across the country.  Irreconcilable ideological splits within the 
regime led to the eventual decision to proceed with a multiparty democracy, the terms of 
which would be reached through negotiations with the opposition and their Roundtable52.  
Negotiations commenced at a time where the power differentiation between the opposition 
and the regime largely favored the opposition.   
Table 2-2 depicts major concessions offered by the MSZMP in the 1980s.   Early 
concessions were offered in response to crises that revealed weaknesses within the regime.  
In order to protect themselves against the declining economy and standard of living, the 
regime offered superficial liberalization such as amendments to the Electoral Law.  While 
this amendment changed the composition of the Transitory Parliament, events such as the 
1988 vote on the Bos-Nagymaros dam project revealed that the parliament was still just an 
extension of the MSZMP.  Later concessions were the result of a growing opposition that 
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began to challenge the regime.  After Kádár’s resignation, the opposition activity 
dramatically increased and the mobilization-liberalization cycle began.   
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TABLE 2-2: Timeline of Major Liberalizing Concessions granted by MSZMP53 
Concession Consequences 
Amendment to Electoral Law, 
1983 
• Electoral competition became compulsory;  
• Transitory Parliament is elected;  
• By 1985, more than 10% elected on “oppositional” 
tickets in 1985; 
•  Transitory Parliament is able to pass legislation pointed 
at systematic change including the facilitation of a market 
economy and a Western-based legal system54  
Amendment to Electoral Law, 
1986 
• Allowed for independent candidates to seek election;  
• Candidates not endorsed by the MSZMP are elected to 
Parliament; 
• Opened political space for opposition to the government55  
Freedom of Press Movement, 1988 • Allowed for the public vetting of  government offenses;  
• Served to further de-legitimize Soviet ideology 
• Opened political space for future opposition56  
Social Rehabilitation of 
Revolutionary Figures, 1988 
• Gave legitimacy to the 1956 uprising, and categorized it 
as a popular uprising versus a counter-revolution;  
• Gave legitimacy to the opposition, increasing its stability 
bargaining power57 
Act on Free Association, January 
1989 
• Gave opposition movements a de jure existence 
(legitimacy)  
• Set a liberalizing precedent in response to confrontation;  
• Increased opposition stability;  
• Roundtable is organized within two months of the 
passage of this act58  
MSZMP Central Committee agrees 
to accept the idea of a multiparty 
democracy, 1989 
• MSZMP no longer held enough power over the 
opposition to continue its existence as an authoritarian 
elite 
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The Opposition 
The growth of the Hungarian opposition was aided by two main factors, the greatest 
of which was the ever increasing liberalized environment in Hungary.  Throughout the 
decade of the 1980s, the regime offered political concessions in response to the economic 
decay and the deterioration of the standard of living.  These crises illuminated the ideological 
differences among the MSZMP.  As a result of the disunity and therefore instability, the 
capability of the regime to repress was diminished.  The regime offered concessions to 
assuage the population and prevent uprising during periods of instability.  While this strategy 
for staying in power worked in the immediate short-term, the long term effects of 
liberalization was the growth of an opposition.   
These concessions provided opposition groups a political space, solidified the 
legitimacy of the opposition movements, and provided the precedent for further concessions 
by the regime in response to challenges.  Political institutions that appeared during the pre-
transition period served to the benefit of the opposition and the deterioration of regime 
strength.  As government concessions became protected by a de jure existence, a venue for 
political contestation was created and soon occupied by the growing opposition.  The 
increased liberalization led to non-violent mass demonstrations and a general increase in civil 
society participation, which weakened the ideologically-based institutional structures59.  
 The opposition grew immensely in the year prior to transition. The rate of growth 
increased rapidly up until the point of negotiation, when the cost to associate with the 
mobilization was lowest due to the ever-increasing cost to the regime to repress.  From the 
early to mid-1980s, the opposition movement has existed mainly through clandestine 
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organizations.  In stark contrast from countries such as Poland, it was absent from the public 
stage and did not have a large or cohesive following.  It made its first public appearance in 
the form of writers seeking populist and nationalist change60.  It wasn’t until 1987 and 1988 
that the first oppositional “proto-parties” emerged61.  The growing cohesiveness and breadth 
of the opposition in response to increased liberalization increased the capabilities of the 
oppositional groups.   
 In September of 1987, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) formed, following 
the model of Solidarity, although it did not represent the working class62.  Its goal was to 
mediate a dialogue between the forming opposition groups and the Communist Party63.  The 
MDF monopolized the oppositional movement until 1988, when more parties were formed.  
It is important to note that up until the Act on Free Association in January of 1989, the 
opposition movement was still nascent.  The two largest parties, the MDF and the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ) had only 10,000 and 1,500 members, respectively64. 
 
Transition: Leading up to the Roundtable 
 The Opposition Roundtable (EKA) was formed in March of 198965 during a time 
when there was a vacuum of political legitimacy66.  Because the opposition was maturing, it 
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was able to take advantage of the inability of the regime to occupy this void.  The 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, up to this point, had provided the opposition with the 
experience and unity it needed to successfully challenge the regime.  Had no such cycle taken 
place, the opposition would not have been prepared for such a undertaking and the results of 
the transition and trajectory may not been as beneficial to the opposition.   
The EKA was able to capitalize on the vacuum of legitimacy that was left in the wake 
of the deteriorating regime.  The EKA combined nine different opposition parties under one 
umbrella group, united by the common principle of consensus.  This provided a very stable 
opposition front, unified under the concept that they would only proceed under unanimity.  
This meant that extremists were by definition excluded from the negotiations.  This basic 
principle gave the EKA the upper hand in defining the terms of the negotiations, and 
protected them from the MSZMP, who desired to negotiate with opposition parties on an 
individual basis in order to divide the Roundtable67.  The EKA refused to accept a coalition 
government with the MSZMP, and the government conceded that they did not have the 
capacity to force the opposition into this agreement.  They were now completely void of 
political legitimacy68.  MSZMP membership dropped from 700,000 to 20,000 members 
during the negotiated transition, and most former members failed to pledge support to the 
successor to the MSZMP, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)69. 
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Event Data Analysis 
 The event data clearly shows the progressive momentum of the mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  The criterion for a catalyst is an indicator event that reveals the 
decreasing capacity of the regime.  This event materializes as government destabilization, 
which decreased the ability of the government to enact repression.  The major destabilizing 
catalyst identified in the data set is the resignation of János Kádár as General Secretary.  
Immediately following this event, mobilization increases, and the response of the 
government to this mobilization is increasingly liberal.  The catalyst event clearly indicates 
the end of a pattern of repression and the beginning of a pattern of concession.   
 The resignation of Kádár did not happen in isolation.  The lack of party unity was 
apparent in the data set earlier, with an increased number of mobilization events occurring in 
1986 and 1987.  In these cases of mobilization, the government was in many situations still 
willing to meet the cost to repress the small opposition movement.  The graph below depicts 
the level of mobilization and repression represented in the data set from 1980 through 1989.   
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FIGURE 2-1: Hungary: Events of Interaction per Year, 1980-198970 
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 As the figure above shows, repression accompanied mobilization at a high rate until 
1988.  In 1988, when evidence supporting the presence of a mobilization-liberalization cycle 
is obvious, the number of repressive events per mobilization event is much smaller.  The 
consequences of this scenario allowed for the increased cost to repress, increased 
mobilization participation, and increased liberalization. 
 This trend can be further analyzed to show how the increasing cost of repression 
decreased the cost of association for the mobilizing population.  Table 2-3 below shows the 
growth in mobilization, which was critical to driving the momentum of the mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  This table reveals the immense growth in opposition activity in 1988.  
More mobilization events were recorded in this year than in the previous eight years, The 
spike in mobilization events was coupled with intense growth in participation.   
By the year 1989, the average number of participants in each mobilization event was 
152,086.10.  The total estimated population in Hungary in 1989 is 10,381,95971.  This means 
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that, on average 1.46% of the population participated in each mobilization event.  This is an 
increase from .021% of the total population participating in each event in 1987.  The drastic 
increase in mobilization represents the decreasing cost to associate, which is directly 
influenced by the regime’s inability or unwillingness to engage in repression.   
 
TABLE 2-3: Mobilization Growth 1980-1989, Hungary72 
 
Year Total 
Mobilization 
Events  
Total 
Repressive 
Events 
Percent of 
Repression 
compared to 
Mobilization 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
1980 1 0 0.0% 8.0 
1981 1 1 100.0% 25.5 
1982 2 1  50.0% 39.3 
1983 1 2  200.0% 60.3 
1984 4 1  25.0% 428.6 
1985 1 0  0.0% 2.0 
1986 3 1  33.3% 2727.0 
1987 6 2  33.3% 2209.0 
1988 20 3  15.3% 10,241.1 
198973  16 0  0.0% 152,086.1 
 
  
While the European Protest and Coercion Event Data set cannot be considered a 
complete compilation of all such events, it shows an obvious correlation between the percent 
of mobilization events resulting in repression to the average number of participants per 
mobilization event.  In the early 1980s, the level of repression was high, and the average 
number of participants per event remained relatively low.   
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We know from the historical literature that in 1986 the MSZMP was internally 
splitting due in part to conflict with the ongoing economic policies of János Kádár.  The rate 
of repression from the data set shows one repression event for every three mobilization 
events, with the rate of participation increasing drastically.   This indicates the perception of 
regime weakening and the decreasing ability of the regime to meet to rising cost of 
repression.  The inability to repress is evidenced by the increase of participation, which 
indicates that the cost of association in decreasing.  The table shows that in 1988 and 1989, 
the average number of participants per mobilization events was 10,241.1 and 152,086.1, 
respectively, a 15-fold increase.  Finally, the legitimacy of the opposition movement is also 
increasing as more concessions are gained over time, creating a history of success for the 
opposition.  
The mobilization-liberalization cycle in Hungary was initiated in 1988.  The catalyst 
event, as stated above, is the resignation of Kádár, a move which was prompted through elite 
splitting, and represented to the population the diminishing legitimacy of the communist 
regime.  The following timeline shows relevant events from the event data set that reveal the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle 
 
 
TIMELINE 2-1:  Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Hungary, 1988-198974 
 
CYCLE OPENS   
CATALYST:  JANOS KADAR RESIGNS May 22, 1988 
May 27: Demonstration against dam construction  
June 7:  Farmer demonstration 
June 16: Dissidents bring flowers to Nagy grave, are rebuffed 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: July 9:  Freedom to Assemble 
 July 19-July 26:  Mobilization for travel to the West 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: July 25: Stock Exchange opens 
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 August 23:  Coal miner strike for better wages 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: August 25: Pay demands met for strikers 
August 29:  Printer strike 
 August 30-31:  Optics workers strike 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: September 1:  Strikers demands met 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: September 9:  Amnesty to 1956 Revolutionaries 
 September 12: Mobilization against dam 
 September 28: Mobilization strike for freedom for lecturers 
 September 29:  Mobilization against dam 
 October 3:  Mobilization against dam 
 October 4:  Mobilization to free conscientious objectors 
 October 22: Mobilization strike for freedom for lecturers 
 October 23:  Mobilization against dam 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  January 11, 1989: Allow non-communist parties; Right to Strike and 
Assemble 
 January 12:  Mobilization against prices 
 February 27: Mobilization against dam 
 March 3:  Mobilization against dam 
 March 6:  Mobilization against dam 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  March 22:  Allow workers to strike for Solidarity 
 April 27:  Mobilization against light sentences for police brutality 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  April 28:  Government hands over Imre Nagy files 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  May 6:  Tear down part of barbed wire on Austrian border 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  May 10:  Publish names of 277 executed in 1956 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  May 14:  Agree to halt dam project 
 May 26: Mobilization to demand final decision on dam project 
June 15:  Mobilization to rebury Imre Nagy 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  July 6:  Imre Nagy ruled innocent 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  July 22:  Free by-elections 
 July 27:  Prison suicide attempts and strike over prison conditions 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  July 31:  Restore old street names 
 August 18:  Mobilization against rising prices 
 August 30:  Reformers seek a post of Presidency 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  September 10:  Open the border with Austria 
September 29:  Mobilization: demand dissolution of Workers’ Militia 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  October 9:  MSZMP dissolved; Create law for multi-party system; release 
Workers’ Militia to the new government; communists surrender government 
 
 This timeline shows the catalyst event, and the subsequent data events present in the 
data set.  Increasingly, the regime’s response to mobilization is to liberalize.  Each 
concession represents a change in power differentiation and the increasing cost of repression.   
The quick succession of events is vital to the continuation of the cycle.  Whereas in previous 
years, the data shows intermittent mobilization, often disassociated from concessions or 
repressive acts, 1988 represents a turning point because the opposition quickly mobilized in 
response to government concessions, and pressured the regime for continued response.  The 
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regime’s diminished capacity to repress, and therefore to preserve its concentration of power 
is shown by the events in the timeline.   
 The regime atmosphere in Hungary made it comparatively easy for a mobilization-
liberalization cycle to gain momentum.  Whereas other countries experienced much more 
repressive regimes, the Hungarian regime had already developed a history of intermittently 
responding to confrontation with concessions, as evidenced in Figure 2-1.  The 
comparatively low risk to mobilize, combined with the presence of a softliner faction allowed 
the cycle to gain momentum.  This resulted in the continual increase in the cost of repression.   
Within a year and a half of the main catalyst event, the regime had agreed to a negotiated 
transition with a mature opposition movement.   
 
Summary  
 Hungary is designated as a Tier 1 country, as it experienced a mild pre-transition 
regime atmosphere, a prolonged mobilization-liberalization cycle, and a post-transition 
democratic trajectory.  The mobilization-liberalization cycle in Hungary lasted for 17 months, 
showing a protracted cycle of interaction.  The government increasingly responded to 
pressure from the opposition with concessions, which increased the cost to repress to a point 
where the regime no longer has the capability to repress mobilization. This 17-month process 
allowed the opposition to mature and to unite under common principles.  They were prepared 
to fill the vacuum of legitimacy left by the MSZMP.  Other case studies will show 
mobilization-liberalization cycles that act over a much shorter period of time and do not 
allow the opposition to grow in such a way that it is capable of filling this political void.   
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 Hungary’s case is one of comparatively lenient regime atmosphere, which eased the 
constraints on the population to form a legitimate opposition.  This history of comparatively 
mild rule helped to promote an effective cycle of interaction.  The consequence of a cycle 
that was of utility to the opposition was a political trajectory that moved toward a 
consolidated democracy.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 3:  POLAND: NEGOTIATION AND THE STORY OF THE 
OPPOSITION 
 
 
Poland is a case where a tradition of a mild regime atmosphere created a favorable 
environment for the opposition.  The 1980-1981 Solidarity experience served to mature the 
opposition, such that the duration of the 1988-1989 mobilization-liberalization cycle was not 
a major factor in preparing the opposition for transition.  The timing of the 1988-1989 cycle 
was however, crucial.  In 1981 the constraints imposed by Soviet foreign policy overpowered 
the opposition’s ability to challenge the Polish regime.  In 1989 however, the international 
constraints no longer existed. The opposition movement again surfaced and after a brief 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, was able to force the regime to negotiate.  The regime’s 
decision to negotiate with Solidarity in 1989 indicated that they could not meet the cost to 
repress the opposition movement, but by enfranchising the group they believed they could 
maintain power in the future government.  Furthermore, the regime needed to embrace 
Solidarity in order to solve the economic crisis.
51 
 
TABLE 3-1:  Regime Atmosphere Rating, Poland75 
Freedom House Political Terror Scale 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Amnesty 
International 
U.S. Dept 
of State 
Total 
Score 
1987 5 5 3 3 16 
1988 5 5 2 2 14 
1989 4 3 2 2 11 
Average 3-
Year Score: 
13.67 
 
Poland’s regime atmosphere average from 1987 to 1989 is 13.67.  This score 
indicates that the regime atmosphere was comparatively mild.   Along with a mild regime 
atmosphere, Poland had a highly developed opposition and a transition that favored 
democratic consolidation.  For these reasons, Poland is designated as a Tier 1 country.   
 
The Regime 
 Poland’s experience with socialism was markedly different from the other countries 
in this study.  In the words of Krzysztof Pomian, Poland was the only Soviet bloc country 
where “authorities were afraid of the working class, not the other way around”76.  The 
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inconsistent application of political terror combined with the unfinished Stalinization 
project77 resulted in a workers’ revolt in June of 1956.   The fallout from this crisis changed 
the political trajectory in Poland.  The forced collectivization policy was ended, new 
leadership was elected, and most importantly to the future of Polish opposition, “The 
structure of reforms created a dialectic whereby the growth of resources for potential 
opponents saw a widening repertoire of contention, which in turn weakened the repressive 
structures still further”78.  These changes created a different socialist experience for the 
people of Poland.  The environment created by the leadership allowed for the development of 
prolonged cycles of interaction between opposition groups and the regime. 
The lessons learned from the 1956 events changed the course of interaction between 
the regime and the opposition: “Polish experiences in 1956 produced, on the one hand, the 
belief in the power of society (the regime can be forced to make concessions).  On the other 
hand, they produced self-assurance among the power elite (masses can be relatively easily 
pacified if one can wait long enough for political energy to burn down)”79.  These lessons 
would determine the future strategies for opposition and regime interaction. 
The events of 1956 destabilized the Polish regime.  Ekiert (1996) argues that Poland 
was the most unstable country in the Soviet bloc, and the consequences of repeated economic 
and political failures were waves of collective protest80.  The various opposition movements 
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established links between various echelons of society81, and created connections that would 
enhance the stability of the opposition.  The weakness of the Polish state as a socialist regime 
stemmed from its improper indoctrination to Soviet socialist values.  Because rank and file 
party members did not fully embrace the ideology, they were not supportive of communist 
leadership during periods of crisis82.   
 The leaders of the Polish regime between 1956 and 1989 desired to maintain a certain 
level of autonomy from Moscow.  In order to achieve a relative independence, they 
pioneered methods of handling crises, which included compromising with various elements 
of society and therefore abandoning critical elements of socialist values.  These techniques of 
rule precluded Poland from achieving totalitarian rule, and promoted the growth of an 
opposition.  The lack of adhesion to socialist values naturally led to instability, because the 
regime could not claim legitimacy based on ideology83.  
 The mild nature of the Polish regime set it apart from other Eastern bloc countries.  
The systematic oppression experienced across other satellites did not exist in Poland.  The 
Roman Catholic Church and intellectuals enjoyed a level of political freedom that was 
prohibited by the ideology-based policies of other regional communist regimes84.  By 1980, 
Polish society had developed into a well-educated and dynamic population.  The traditional 
values of Polish culture were much more predominant than communist ideology85.   The 
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instability of the regime combined with the comparatively mild political environment left it 
open to challenge by an opposition, the most threatening of which was the Solidarity 
movement of 1980-1981.   
 The strikes of July and August 1980 were in response to the many perceived failures 
of the regime: “remoteness, exclusiveness, arbitrariness, unaccountability, incompetence, 
repressiveness, and illegitimacy….their contempt for social justice and their corruption, 
careerism, arrogance, frivolity and mediocrity”86.  The primary complaint was the economic 
situation.  The Polish government had increased its outstanding external debt from $7.4 
billion to over $21 billion in just five years.  The regime was forced to raise the prices of 
meat for the third time, without warning to the public: “This decision seemed so perversely 
suicidal that some observers believed it to be a deliberate provocation, intended to elicit 
protests and disorders that could then be conveniently crushed, thereby facilitating a 
reversion to a comprehensively repressive system”87.  The response was loud and clear, in the 
form of a mass popular uprising that used its fierce adherence to group unity as its greatest 
weapon.  The instability of the government due to low legitimacy and political incompetence 
did not allow the movement to be immediately repressed.   
 The level of participation in the Solidarity movement was unprecedented.  
Approximately 11.8 million people or one third of the country had membership in Solidarity.  
When the movement was finally suppressed in 1981, one out of every five Polish citizens had 
participated in at least one collective protest88.  The declaration of martial law in Poland on 
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December 13, 1981 was the most extensive domestic military operation that the region had 
seen since the introduction of state-socialism89.  It demonstrated the regime’s ability to 
repress an opposition movement, although in order to do so, it “abdicate[d] political power in 
favor of organized forces of repression”90.  The declaration of martial law resulted in the 
arrest of the opposition leaders, the prohibition of independent meetings and opposition 
participation in public politics, the state-inflicted deaths of striking miners, and military and 
police surveillance.  Although General Jaruzelski claimed that the declaration was necessary 
avoid a Soviet invasion, it has since been suggested that the Soviets had previously decided 
against this action91. 
The regime attempted to create new venues for political discussion after Solidarity 
was outlawed.  In July of 1983, a constitutional amendment created PRON92, which was to 
be an official organization that united the citizens and the government.  It was an important 
precedent because the government effectively gave up any attempt for complete domination 
of the public93.  In creating this organization, the government explicitly forbade the 
participation of Solidarity94, which meant that up to a third of the population was barred from 
participating in this joint council.  Needless to say, PRON did not gain substantial support.  
In 1986, the regime again made an attempt to incorporate public opinion into its policy, by 
initiating the Social Cosultative Council, which was to be an organization that allowed for 
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the exchange of views between the population and the state.  This effort was also snubbed by 
the public, as most intellectuals and members of Solidarity refused to participate95.
 Between 1982 and 1989, certain aspects of marital law became incorporated into 
“normal” law.  The penal code was adapted to become harsher, although government politics 
became noticeably more liberal, “as if the state wanted to have at its disposal a variety of 
legal weapons against society without actually taking recourse to them”96.  The regime never 
engaged in consistent repression following the martial-law period.  The experience of martial 
law, while repressing the opposition movement, did not solve the economic problems of 
country, nor did it provide the government with the tools needed to confront the increasingly 
critical economic situation97.  While the declaration of martial law can be superficially 
compared to the cases in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), the result of the 
repression in Poland did not break the political stalemate between the opposition and the 
regime98.  The opposition in Poland experienced more than a year of liberalization, which 
would not be forgotten with the installation of a brief period of repression. 
 Throughout the course of the 1980s, the already tenuous legitimacy of the regime 
further waned as repeated attempts to control the impending economic crisis failed.  This 
destabilization was not unnoticed by the general population as new waves of strikes began in 
1988.  The Solidarity movement in the early 1980s marked the beginning of the end for the 
Polish communist regime.  The imposition of martial law extended the reign, but did not 
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solve the inherent and increasing problems for the regime.  In late 1988, the regime was 
forced to admit that it could no go on without the popular support that could be gained from a 
compromise with Solidarity:  
In the spring of 1989, the Polish party, humiliated by the Solidarność 
experience, held in contempt by the army officers who had been forced to 
rescue it, and shorn of anything resembling programmatic cohesion, sat on the 
sidelines as General Jaruzelski sanctioned a high level national “Round Table” 
to restructure the government and invited Solidarność in from the cold to 
bring legitimacy to the initiative99.   
 
The Opposition 
 The effects of the Solidarity movement forever changed the relationship between the 
opposition and the regime, and although the movement was suppressed, the experience of 
Solidarity marked the beginning of the end of communism in Poland, and in Eastern Europe:  
…too much had happened in Poland—specifically too much lived democratic 
experience—for social life to return to the status quo ante.  Solidarność 
continued—in a thousand underground publications, in nationwide networks 
of cooperating activists and in new civic habits tested in struggle.  With the 
party bereft of any capacity for serious structural innovation, the economic 
crisis deepened with each passing year”100.   
 
The repressive fallout from martial law lasted until 1986, when the regime granted a 
full amnesty for members of Solidarity101.   
 Solidarity was forced underground in 1981 but never lost its influence and was never 
completely repressed.  With the help of the Roman Catholic Church, it maintained activity 
illegally, and published over 1300 periodicals to counter the ongoing distribution of state 
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propaganda102.  As the level of political repression was eased, groups began to gradually 
reappear and test the government’s limits of their activities103.  The presence of opposition 
had always been a feature of Polish society, and this tradition was not lost during the brief 
period of intense repression.    
The events of protest that took place in Poland were a direct result of the mild regime 
atmosphere and the inherent instability of the regime.  Furthermore, the regime’s inability 
and unwillingness to consistently repress popular mobilization created a long history of 
opposition-regime interaction.  At several points in Poland’s socialist history, mobilization-
liberalization cycles were initiated.  Arguably, the cycle that led to the formation of 
Solidarity was the strongest example of a mobilization-liberalization cycle in the history of 
communist Eastern Europe.  This cycle was not, however, successful in bringing down the 
regime.  This is because of the effect of the international community in the early 1980s.  In 
the pre-Gorbachev era, opposition activity was limited by precedents such as the 1956 
Revolution in Hungary and the 1968 Prague Spring.   
 The effects of Solidarity however, had lasting consequences on both the opposition 
movement and the regime.  The opposition realized that the movement was unrealistic given 
the international constraints104 of the time.  A movement of the same breadth and momentum 
never again surfaced in Poland, although after the advent of the perestroika reforms, a much 
less stable opposition was able to topple the regime as the regime itself lost stability with the 
new Soviet foreign policy.   
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 The major events that sparked new mobilization in Poland were the worsening 
condition of the economy, and the advent of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, which 
removed the Soviet constraints that prevented major change in 1981.  During the military 
rule, the government attempted to implement an economic model that followed Kádár’s 
example in Hungary.  The purpose was to improve the economy dramatically so that popular 
support could be won105.  This program was just as ineffective in Poland as it was in Hungary.  
The dire lack of popular support for the regime led to destabilization.   
 In 1987, the regime initiated a new economic program that shifted the concentration 
of trade away from the Soviet Union and allowed small private firms to be established with a 
limited number of employees.  The government realigned prices by increasing the cost of 
energy and certain food products.  Where the level of inflation had steadily held around 20% 
in 1987, it increased to 60% in 1988, and 150% in the first six months of 1989.  The external 
debt was a catastrophic 55% of the country’s GDP.  By the late 1980s, the economic situation 
was on the verge of crisis106.  The regime’s inability to successfully deal with the economy 
weakened its political position.  The regime found itself in a precarious situation: having no 
popular support it actually needed the leadership of the illegal Solidarity movement to rally 
the population behind the government.     
 In 1987 the regime announced that it would hold a referendum on economic reform in 
order to create public support for new policies.  Solidarity responded by advising that citizens 
ignore the referendum.  As a consequence, the government did not achieve the 50% vote 
required to proceed with economic reform.  This outcome “shaped the perception that the 
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government would no loner even pretend to have the support of the public for its economic 
policies”107.   
 The effects of perestroika enhanced the situation of the opposition.  The regime tried 
to maintain the ability to enact political and economic reform through a policy of 
“consultative democracy”108, where citizens would be consulted in the making of policy.  
This plan backfired when the population, still influenced significantly by the leaders of the 
underground Solidarity, refused to participate in what they saw as futile reforms.  This 
maneuvering made the regime realize that they needed the influence of Solidarity on their 
side in order to save themselves from imminent collapse.  The regime initiated the contact 
with the opposition that was necessary to begin unofficial negotiations.   
 When Solidarity increased its activity in 1987 and 1988, it was not the powerful 
union that it had once been.  It lacked both unity and breadth of movement, and therefore was 
much weaker than it had been during 1980 and 1981.  The new waves of strikes in Poland 
were poorly orchestrated and lacked the character of the early Solidarity movement: 
“Bridging the social boundaries became difficult.  Strikes sharpened existing divisions and 
were not supported by any of the country’s social elite.  Finally, they did not produce new 
organizational structures and identities”109.  By the time negotiations began, Solidarity itself 
was suffering from disunity and factions, the effect of which intensified over time and 
affected their electoral success in the coming years.    
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Transition 
With the suppression of the Solidarity movement in 1981, the regime was able to 
temporarily control the opposition.  This situation changed over time however, and as the 
demobilization process occurred, the political environment again became more liberal and 
opposition activity increased.  By 1988, a stalemate existed between the regime and the 
opposition, with neither group holding enough power to gain mass support.  The 
development of a mobilization-liberalization cycle was affected by the lessons learned by 
both sides during 1980 and 1981.  The opposition had learned that it could challenge the 
regime to its breaking point, and the regime had learned that it could enlist the threat of 
Soviet involvement to quell the opposition.  In 1989 however, the dynamics of interaction 
had changed.  The Soviet Union could no longer be used to bolster the position of the Polish 
regime, and the successive failed economic reforms had disillusioned the public to the extent 
that the regime no longer held any popular legitimacy.    
 A mobilization-liberalization cycle had existed in Poland in 1980 and 1981110.  The 
regime atmosphere had allowed for the development of a cycle and the consequence of 
continued interaction with the regime was a matured opposition.   This makes the Polish case 
unique: a mature opposition existed in the recent memory of the population.  Had the 
international constraints been absent in 1981, the possibility for an earlier transition would 
have been more likely.  However, with the imposition of martial law in 1981 the opposition 
became dormant, until the regime’s economic crisis caused destabilization, and strikes again 
disrupted political life.  The dormant opposition became active when it perceived that the 
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regime had become destabilized, and thus triggered a new mobilization-liberalization cycle 
which forced the regime to negotiate a transition. 
 In the spring of 1988,  a series of strikes began in factories and universities.  By May, 
independent street demonstrations were underway and the strikes had spread to the Lenin 
Shipyard, where the Solidarity movement had begun eight years earlier111.  In addition to 
increased wages and benefits, the demonstrators demanded the restoration of the Solidarity 
union and the reinstitution of Solidarity activists112.  The strikes did not have the same effect 
as in 1980, however, as they failed to gain mass support across the different regions of the 
country.  In the summer of 1988, a new wave of strikes broke out, this time gaining enough 
notoriety to be seen as a threat to the government.  The regime understood that a new crisis 
was breaking out, and the leaders agreed to meet with opposition representatives113. 
 The idea of an “anticrisis pact” began circulating among the leaders of opposition and 
the regime.  The theory behind such a pact was that the stalemate would be resolved through 
an agreement where Solidarity would support the government’s reforms in exchange for their 
legalization and limited access to parliament114.  Solidarity leader Lech Wałesa engineered 
the end to the strikes, in return for the government’s commitment to negotiate.  In doing this, 
he was able to gain incredible concessions from the government that led to transition:   
By ending the unplanned strikes in the name of an honorable compromise in 
August 1988, Solidarity leaders set limits to the political agenda for an 
agreement with the regime; further, by excluding from the roundtable 
negotiations the possibility that the Leninist regime could lose elections, 
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Solidarity transformed the negotiations from an attempt at co-optation into an 
opportunity for political competition115. 
 
The roundtable in Poland set the example for other transitions in the region.  It was not 
merely a session for the discussion of new economic policy, but an actual agreement by the 
regime to discuss plans for a new government.  This was an unprecedented result for the 
opposition.   
 The events in Poland set the stage for transitions across Eastern Europe.  The 
roundtable negotiations proved that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.  The negotiations in 
Poland were not democratic negotiations, however: the participants in the sessions were 
limited to certain groups within the population, and the guidelines for the first election 
guaranteed that a communist majority would be elected.  While not ideal, they set an 
important model for oppositions across the region to follow. 
 In the Polish scenario, neither the opposition nor the regime had the capability of 
gaining enough popular support to proceed alone.  This scenario is very different from the 
situation seen in Hungary, where the disparity in power allowed the Hungarian opposition to 
control the negotiations.  In Poland, any disparity was much smaller.  The opposition was not 
able to gain the same caliber of concessions as the Hungarian opposition.  The outcome of 
the negotiations produced a new coalition government where the percentages of 
representation had been decided prior to elections.  This guaranteed that communist leaders 
would maintain influence.  The regime opted to negotiate before the opposition reached a 
level of strength where they may have been able to preclude communists from future 
leadership.    
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Event Data Analysis 
 In the case of Poland, the opposition was already mature in the pre-transition phase116.  
A long history of mild regime atmosphere led to a tradition of constant opposition activity.  
In November of 1988, a mobilization-liberalization cycle began and rapidly developed.  The 
government acknowledged that it needed the help of the opposition to proceed with 
economic and political reforms, and this perception of instability triggered the opening of the 
cycle.   
 The timeline below depicts the development of the cycle.  Whereas the model 
stipulates that oppositions benefit most from prolonged mobilization-liberalization cycles, the 
Polish opposition was able to orchestrate a favorable transition after a short cycle due to its 
historical maturity.  The events of 1980 and 1981 show a mobilization-liberalization cycle 
that matured the opposition.  Because of the international constraints, the regime calculated 
that it could meet the cost of repression by imposing martial law and maintain complete 
control over the population, whereas in a negotiation they risked losing power.  With the 
advent of perestroika, East European regimes could no longer meet the costs of repressing 
mature oppositions, and the best option to maintain power was through negotiation.     
 
TIMELINE 3-1: Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Poland, 1988117 
CYCLE OPENS 
 CATALYST 31 AUGUST 1988: STATE AGREES TO CONSIDER SOLIDARITY           
RECOGNITION; WAŁESA ASKS STRIKERS TO STOP 
                           03 SEPTEMBER 1988: WAŁESA PERSUADES COAL MINERS TO END STRIKE 
 September 6: Petition, Steal workers file complaint of police brutality 
 September 6: Repression, State refuses to recognize Solidarity in its present form 
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 September 11: Rally, Strike leaders and intellectuals rally for Solidarity recognition 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: September 15-16: Wałesa has talks with the Interior Minister 
 September 15: Demonstration, Protest of foundry that pollutes water 
 September 16: Repression, Prosecutor detains seven mine strike leaders 
 September 18: Rally, Wałesa tells rally that Solidarity will soon be recognized 
 September 19: Rally, International PEN holds first meeting, asks for democracy 
 September 24: Repression, Police raid flat where students meet, arrest them 
 September 26: Demonstration, Students demand release of leaders: march past Communist Party building 
 October 4: Rally, Rector of Warsaw University asks for legalization of NZS and Solidarity 
 October 6: Repression, new PM says that Solidarity will never be legalized 
 October 7: Symbolic, Street theater group makes fun of secret police 
 October 7: Demonstration, Former striking workers protest their firing 
 October 11: Rally, Students rally in more than six cites for recognition 
 October 14: Repression, Government asks removal of dissidents on roundtable  
 October 16: Demonstration, Youths march against PM Rokowski, police attack 
 October 17: Repression, State delays the start of roundtable talks; blames Solidarity 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: October 18, Court releases dissident held 18 months without trial  
 October 21: Demonstration, Protest against housing shortage 
 October 25: Boycott, Wałesa rejects request for meeting to delete two people from Solidarity on roundtable 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: October 26: Cardinal Glemp and Jaruzelski meet to discuss roundtable 
 October 27: Demonstration, Protest to reinstate fired striking workers 
 October 28: Demonstration, Students demonstrate for housing 
 October 31: Petition, Solidarity says the decision to close Lenin Shipyards in political 
 November 1: Rally, Mass to prevent Lenin Shipyard’s close 
 November 1: Demonstration, Flowers placed on strike monument 
 November 2: Rally, OPZZ unions join Solidarity in rally to prevent closing 
 November 3-4: Rally, Margaret Thatcher and Lech Wałesa lay wreaths in huge rally 
 November 6-7, Symbolic, Street theaters “celebrates” Bolshevik Revolution anniversary 
 November 6: Rally, Wałesa tells rally he will call a strike alert 
 November 8: Strike, Young workers defy Wałesa and strike 
 November 11: Demonstration, Protestors clash with police in Polish independence anniversary 
 November 11: Demonstration, March for Polish independence 
 November 11: Demonstration, Police block young people from Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
 November 11: Demonstration, Police drive van into demonstration 
 November 11: Demonstration, Marchers demand PM Rokowski’s resignation 
 November 11: Symbolic, Dissidents throw leaflets down into military parade 
 November 11: Demonstration, Call for free elections 
 November 12-15: Hunger strike, Protest police violence 
 November 15: Repression, Police arrest three leaders in advance of Ursus rally 
 November 15: Rally, Workers rally at Ursus plant to rehire strike workers 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 15, Wałesa accepts offer to debate OPZZ leader on TV 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 1, Hunger strike ends as state reinstates workers 
 November 16: Petition, Church attacks state for sabotaging roundtable talks 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 17-18, Wałesa meets with Interior Minister 
 November 20: Demonstration, Teenagers march on Communist Party building 
 November 25: Demonstration, Students protest curriculum 
 November 27: Rally, Wałesa leads an anti-Socialist rally 
 November 30: Rally, Jubilant supporters throng Wałesa 
 December 1: Rally, Supporters welcome Wałesa back to Gdansk 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: December 3, State approves Wałesa’s request for a passport 
 December 4: Demonstration, Supports Solidarity legalization 
 December 8: Repression, Six indicted for bus/tram strikes in August/September 
 December 9: Repression, KPN leader arrested and warned no more protesting 
 December 9: Rally, Supporters rally as Wałesa leaves for France 
 December 11: Riot, Teenagers break police station windows 
 December 12: Rally, Wałesa mobbed as he returns from France 
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 December 12: Repression, PM Rakowski rules out legalization of Solidarity 
 December 12: Strike, Three departments strike against inflation in Nowa Huta 
 December 13: Riot, Youths throw percussion grenades, tear gas and stones at police 
 December 13: Demonstration, 7th anniversary of martial law, many cities across Poland 
 December 13: Strike, 100 workers shut production line at Ursus factory 
 December 16-17: Rally, Anniversary of bread riots, many cities across Poland 
 December 16: Rally, Mass for victims of bread riots 
 December 16: Demonstration: protest 
 December 18: Rally, Intellectuals gather to advise Wałesa on roundtable talks 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: December 21, Six hardliners purged; eight reformers brought into Politburo 
 December 22: Repression, Wałesa says Party refuses Solidarity demands for roundtable 
 December 26-29: Hunger Strike, to release three pacifists arrested earlier in December 
 December 30: Demonstration, Climb to top of Communist Party building, unfurl banner 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: December 30, State frees last political prisoner, a dissident policeman 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION:  December 30, Wałesa meets PM in Sejm, discusses reforms 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: January 1, 1989, Jaruzelski promises a more democratic electoral system 
 January 4: Rally, Fighting Solidarity leader talks about striking in Lenin Shipyard 
 January 6: Strike, Transport workers ask for wage increases 
 January 6-7: Strike, Two steel plants strike for wage increases 
 January 6-7: Strike, Salespersons strike for wage increases 
 January 7: Strike, Transport workers ask for wage increases 
 January 8: Rally, Wałesa criticizes Fighting Solidarity at rally 
 January 10: Repression, State refuses to register independent press association 
 January 10: Demonstration, March against construction of nuclear power plant 
 January 12: Wałesa asks for unity, end of violent street protest 
 January 13: Demonstration, Protest for recognition of Solidarity, police attack 
 January 13-20: Strike, Textile workers strike for higher pay and recognition 
 January 15: Repression, Police stop KPN press conference, say it’s illegal 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: January 17, PM Rakowski offers to register Solidarity if it cooperates 
 January 17: Demonstration, Dissident toss leaflets asking for Jaruzelski’s resignation 
 January 17: Demonstration, Students ask for Jaruzelski’s resignation 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: January 18, Central Committee of the Party agrees to legalize Solidarity, 
gradually 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, January 19, State lifts ban on forming new unions 
 January 19: Demonstration, Students demonstrate, KPN campaigns 
 January 19: Demonstration, Students march to Communist Party headquarters 
 January 20: Strike, Transport workers strike, then management agrees 
 January 20: Strike, Miners stage a warning strike over conditions and pay 
 January 21: Rally, Wałesa recommends acceptance of state offer of talks 
 January 21: Repression, Priest murdered by police 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: January 22, State offers talks, Solidarity accepts 
 January 22: Demonstration, riot police block celebratory demonstration 
 January 26: Rally, Funeral of slain priest attracts thousands 
 January 26: Demonstration, March to Popieluszko’s grave 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: January 27, Solidarity and state agree to start talks on February 6, 1989 
 
 
 Prior to the 1988-1989 mobilization-liberalization cycle, the Polish opposition and 
regime were in a stalemated situation.  The opposition was gradually gaining strength, 
although it was not the powerful organization that it had once been.  The regime had become 
very unstable due to internal conflict: some party members advocated a hardliner stance, 
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while others were pushing for reform.  The regime would have been incapable of adopting a 
hardliner stance, as throughout the late 1980s they had made half-hearted attempts at 
“consultative democracy”.  Regardless of the ideological position of the regime, they were 
powerless to initiate any reforms because they lacked popular legitimacy.  This was clearly 
shown in the 1987 boycotted referendum.  
 Table 3-2 shows the change in mobilization in the year preceding the roundtable 
negotiations.  February 1988 marks the beginning of a wave of spring strikes, which peaked 
in May.  Another wave of summer strikes peaked in August 1988.  In September of 1988, 
Solidarity leader Lech Wałesa demonstrated his influence by encouraging workers to end 
their strikes.  At this point in time, Solidarity became actively involved in government talks.  
The government’s choice to speak with opposition leaders demonstrated the weakness of the 
regime.  Accordingly, November of 1988 shows another spike in mobilization, signifying the 
continued growth of the movement in response to perceived regime instability.   The 
roundtable talks began in February of 1989.   
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TABLE 3-2: Mobilization Growth February 1988- January 1989, Poland118 
Date Total 
Mobilization 
Events 
Total 
Repressive 
Events 
Percent of 
Repression 
compared to 
Mobilization 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
February 1988 9 9 100.0% 2949.4 
March 1988 19 8 42.0% 1466.4 
April 1988 20 6 30.0% 3963.1 
May 1988 32 21 65.6% 3766.4 
June 1988119 12 1 8.3% 462.6 
July 1988 5 4 80.0% 1145.0 
August 1988 28 8 28.6% 3374.6 
September 1988 12 6 50.0% 5500.0 
October 1988 10 3 30.0% 1013.2 
November 1988 27 1 3.7% 3601.4 
December 1988 22 4 18% 980.2 
January 1989120 20 3 15% 867.9 
  
 The Polish statistics are noteworthy because they show a very small percentage121 of 
opposition mobilization.  In the months prior to negotiation less than one thousand people 
participated in each mobilization event.  This number is minute compared to the mobilization 
seen in 1980 and 1981122.  The events in the data set depict the stalemate that existed between 
the opposition and the regime.  However, analyzing the events of specific months help to 
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show how this stalemate was resolved over the course of 1988.  Increased mobilization is 
seen in three months: May, August and November of 1988.  In May and August, coordinated 
workers’ strikes began.  This is evident in both the number of mobilization events and the 
increase in participation that occurred during these months.  The strikes in the spring of 1988 
were met with increased levels of repression.  By August, the number of repression events 
remained low compared to the level of mobilization, and in November, only one repressive 
event took place compared to 27 events of mobilization.  The following graphs will further 
explore these relationships by taking into incorporating events of government concession.   
 Figures 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3 outline the relative proportions of events in the months of 
May, August, and November.  The spring strikes peaked in May of 1988, and the graph 
below shows a stalemated situation.  There were 21 events of repression compared to 32 
mobilization events in May.  The percentage of repression events is 65.4% of all mobilization 
events.  Only one incident of concession is reported: the percentage of concessions therefore 
is only 3.13% of all mobilization events.  This represents a stalemated situation, where 
mobilization continues even though repression is high.  The regime lacked legitimacy and 
could not meet the cost of repression, nor were they willing to meet the demands of the 
opposition.  The opposition, in turn, was unable to muster the support it needed to drive the 
regime to negotiate.  The stalemate would only be resolved through a further loss of regime 
strength, and/or an increase of opposition strength.   
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FIGURE 3-1: May 1998 Events, Poland123 
 
 The events of August 1988 show the evolution of the stalemated condition.  The 
summer strikes peaked in August, and while the number of mobilization events remained 
high, the number of repression events decreased.  The percentage of repression is only 28.6 
% of all mobilization events.  This is a marked decreased from May of 1988.  Furthermore, 
the number of concessions per mobilization event rose dramatically in August, as the number 
of concession represents 14.3% of all mobilization events.   
 
FIGURE 3-2:  August 1988 Events, Poland124 
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 Two very important events happen between September and November of 1988.  First, 
in September of 1988, Lech Wałesa successfully ended the strikes, demonstrating to the 
regime his influence over the population.  Second, in return for this gesture, the government 
began active conversation with the leaders of Solidarity, which effectively granted the 
organization de facto legality because the government officially recognized their existence.  
By invited Wałesa to talks, the regime revealed the weakness of its position.  It was unable to 
continue without the support of Solidarity.  This display of weakness broke the stalemate. 
 The perception of weakness touched off a short mobilization-liberalization cycle in 
which the already mature opposition quickly brought the regime to the point of negotiation.  
The graph below shows the events of November 1988, and the dramatic increase of 
government concessions per mobilization event.   
 
FIGURE 3-3:  November 1988 Events, Poland125 
 
In November of 1988, events of repression represent a mere 3.7% percent of all mobilization 
events, while the number of concessions is similar to the August percentages: 11.1% of all 
mobilization events.  This numerically indicates the beginning of the mobilization-
liberalization cycle.   
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 The stalemate was broken as the regime began to respond to mobilization with 
concession.  It is important to note that while the cycle began in September, the level of 
mobilization did not increase from previous months, nor did the average number of 
participants per event.  This is because the regime’s weakened position indicated that it was 
incapable of meeting the cost of repression.  By inviting the illegal opposition group to talks, 
the regime demonstrated its inability to repress the current level of opposition mobilization.  
This was the display of weakness necessary to break the stalemate and therefore an increase 
in mobilization was not required to gain concessions.  
 
Summary  
 In the case of Poland, the opposition was matured through the Solidarity movement of 
1980-1981, but the international constraints precluded them from reaching negotiations with 
the regime.  With the onset of martial law, the opposition went underground, but reappeared 
(though in a less powerful form) in the late 1980s.  The economic crisis in Poland awakened 
the opposition movement.  The regime realized that it needed the support of the people to 
enact economic reform, but was unable to gather the required support.  It was forced to 
appeal to the outlawed Solidarity in order to solve the political and economic crises, and 
maintain future influence.      
 When the regime enlisted the help of Solidarity leader Lech Wałesa, it revealed its 
vulnerability and the opposition again became very actively involved in public life.  This 
event sparked the beginning of a mobilization-liberalization cycle in which the opposition 
rapidly gained concessions until the regime agreed to negotiations.  Because the opposition 
was already matured, the duration of the 1988-1989 mobilization-liberalization cycle did not 
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affect its ability to achieve a favorable transition.  Poland is ranked as a Tier 1 country due to 
its mild regime atmosphere, which allowed for a mature opposition and the development of a 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, and its post-transition democratic trajectory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 4:  CZECHOSLOVAKIA, NEITHER NEGOTIATED NOR STOLEN 
 
 
 Czechoslovakia experienced a severe regime atmosphere, with a pre-transition score 
of 18.33.  The importance of including Czechoslovakia in this case study is that it shows 
characteristics of a democratic trajectory, but also of a rushed and incomplete mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  This questions the premise for this thesis:  a protracted mobilization-
liberalization cycle is more likely to lead to a post-transition democratic trajectory.  How 
then, was Czechoslovakia able to move quickly toward a consolidated democracy without 
having benefited from enduring this pattern of interaction?    
 
TABLE 4-1: Regime Atmosphere Rating, Czechoslovakia126 
 
Freedom House Political Terror Scale 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Amnesty 
International 
U.S. Dept 
of State 
Total 
Score 
1987 7 6 3 3 19 
1988 7 6 2 3 18 
1989 6 6 3 3 18 
Average 3-
Year Score: 
18.33 
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 This table was derived from Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) and Political Terror Scale 
(www.politicalterrorscale.org) scores for the given country from 1987 to 1989.   The 3-Year average is a 
calculation of the average score in each category over the given time period. This score is used to provide a 
regime atmosphere rating.   
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The theory of the mobilization-liberalization cycle asserts that these patterns of 
interaction are most likely to take place in countries with milder regime atmospheres.  
Czechoslovakia scored a high Freedom House-Political Terror Scale average, indicating a 
severe regime atmosphere.  The severity of the regime led to a variant mobilization-
liberalization cycle that produced a mature opposition through an altered pattern of 
interaction.  This particular case study will show that, while the proposed mobilization-
liberalization cycle did not develop in Czechoslovakia, a mature opposition was created 
nonetheless.   
The hypothesis states that countries which experienced a protracted mobilization-
liberalization cycle developed mature oppositions.  The model of the cycle shows that an 
opposition perceives that a regime has become unstable, and mobilizes in response.  In the 
model, a regime can respond to an event of mobilization through repression or concession.  
The case of Czechoslovakia shows incomplete or failed response to opposition mobilization.  
While the regime routinely repressed movements, it did not completely eliminate the 
movement.  In some cases, evidence exists that the regime neglected to respond at all to 
mobilization.  These responses elicit a similar effect to concession, because the cost of 
repression is increased.   
When a regime fails to fully suppress a mobilization event, it sets a precedent for the 
level of repression that it uses in response to mobilization.  The opposition learns that 
mobilization is met with some repression, but not total repression, and therefore continues to 
mobilize.  The consequences of incomplete repression or failure to respond to mobilization 
are an increase in the cost to repress.  The opposition will continue to mobilize until their 
challenges result in a higher level of repression.   This pattern of interaction is seen in the 
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event data from Czechoslovakia.  The opposition actively mobilized throughout the decade 
prior to transition, because their actions were met with inconsistent and incomplete 
repression.  This pattern of interaction is a variant of the mobilization-liberalization cycle: 
liberalization is not achieved, but the cost of repression is nonetheless increased, and the 
result is a mature opposition.  
A human rights demonstration in 1987 shows an example of an incomplete repression 
in response to mobilization.  The demonstration was held to celebrate the end of Karel 
Srp’s127 political imprisonment:   
It was small and peaceful, and the police though equipped with riotshields and 
other equipment did not bother to disperse it…A few rioters were arrested and 
detained by the armed police, but it was no more remarkable than that—just 
another demonstration…Nonetheless, it was of great political significance 
because it was publicized by the West128. 
 
This mobilization event is an important example because it did not elicit a response that 
suppressed the demonstration.  In addition, this response strategy set a precedent that the 
regime was not willing to meet the costs to repress the movement entirely.  Through events 
such as this, the opposition learned that a certain level of mobilization would be tolerated.  
This precedent provided the opposition with a strategy for mobilization:  small mobilization 
events have little cost to the opposition and are not met with full repression. 
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involvement.   
 
128
 Bradley, J. F. N. 1992, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution: a Political Analysis, East European Monographs, 
Boulder.  (40)  
  
 
77 
The Regime After 1968 
 The year 1968 marked a major change in the political course of Czechoslovakia.  The 
hopes of leadership that would rule by Alexander Dubček’s reformed brand of communism, 
‘socialism with a human face’, were dashed upon the invasion of Warsaw Pact forces and the 
violent repression of the reform movement.  The years that followed the Prague Spring 
brought an increasingly repressive neo-Stalinist regime, including party purges, political 
imprisonments, and the repression of public dissent: “Restructured and controlled by 
Moscow, the political elite systematically reintroduced the strongest possible totalitarian and 
bureaucratic control of the political, economic and cultural institutions and associations…129”.  
The new regime introduced a policy of “normalization”, under which approximately one 
third of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia quit or was purged, in what was possibly the 
largest party purge in East European history130.   
The new leadership under Gustàv Husàk used the then-healthy Czechoslovak 
economy to encourage the public to acquiesce to the new, ultra-conservative regime.  As long 
as the population benefited from the economy, Husàk believed that the events of the Prague 
Spring and the ongoing occupation could be ignored131.  Interestingly, despite the change in 
leadership philosophy resulting from the events of 1968, much of the top leadership under 
Husàk had previously supported Dubček’s reform132.  This is apparent in Husàk’s 
justification for the continued normalization policy: “…the remainder, including the Party 
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rank and file, were not expected to actively toe the ideological line, but were expected to 
knuckle down to work”133.  The internal conflict over ideological rule weakened the stability 
of Husàk’s regime.   
 Even while presiding over one of the most repressive regimes in the East European 
bloc, Husàk’s legitimacy was tenuous.  During the party purges and political trials that 
followed the Prague Spring, it is notable that Husàk’s regime did not try Dubček, the leader 
of the pre-1968 reform134.  Instead, many “second echelon communists” were tried and sent 
to jail135.  At the height of normalization, an estimated 200,000 political prisoners were jailed 
in Czechoslovakia.  This number was public knowledge and challenged the legitimacy of the 
regime after the Helsinki Agreement on Human Rights was signed by the Czechoslovak 
government in 1975136. 
 The repressive nature of the regime affected all areas of public life.  The universities 
suffered from the conservative policies, which were especially repressive to the social 
sciences.  University life in Czechoslovakia was markedly less active than in neighboring 
countries137 with comparatively milder regimes.  The conservative policy left no room for 
reform, a stance which stunted the growth of an opposition.   
 Changes that did take place within the regime were inspired by the effects of the 
repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine and Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms.  In December of 1987, 
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Husàk resigned as Party Secretary (although he maintained his Presidency) and was replaced 
by Miloš Jakeš.  In the case of Hungary, the replacement of the Party Secretary caused 
perceivable regime destabilization.  In Czechoslovakia, however, the change in leaders did 
not have the same effect.  Jakeš was also a hardliner, and had overseen the party purges that 
took place under Husàk’s policy of normalization.  The elections after Jakeš’s appointment 
resulted in an almost complete sweep for hardliners.  The new party secretary was able to 
pass reforms, but like Husàk was unwilling to implement them138. 
 
The Opposition 
Despite the severity of the regime atmosphere, the opposition benefited from two 
major events of regime destabilization.  The first was the regime’s decision to sign the 
Helsinki Final Act on Human Rights in 1975.  This agreement bound all signatories to agree 
to the international monitoring of human rights139.  In acknowledging a standard for human 
rights, the regime gave dissidents a viable platform upon which to launch an opposition 
movement.  Indeed, the majority of mobilization that took place from 1975 to 1989 was 
inspired by the regime’s blatant neglect of human rights: “Groups like Charter 77 and the 
Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted [VONS] continued to function, despite 
regular jailings, more or less continuously from 1977-78 until the Velvet Revolution”140.  
The second major event that brought imminent destabilization was the declining economy.  
Since Husàk based much of the legitimacy of his regime on the strength of the economy, he 
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could expect to meet a much less acquiescent public once the economic benefits of his reign 
were lost.    
In 1976, a group of Czechoslovak dissidents drafted a declaration that called for the 
international respect of human rights, in response to the regime’s superficial 
acknowledgement of the Helsinki Final Act.  This document became known as Charter 77, 
and was signed by 248 citizens upon its release on January 1, 1977141.  The fallout from the 
document resulted in the arrest of the founders of the movement, the expulsion of two 
professors, the loss of 14 jobs, the physical abuse of many women associated with the 
movement, and the harassment of the friends and family of those involved142.  While the 
repression was swift and severe, the movement continued.  The events following the release 
of Charter 77 were made public through Radio Free Europe.  Within 14 months of Charter 77, 
a second Human Rights group focused on defending those who were unjustly imprisoned143, 
VONS144 was founded.   
After 1978, the same small group of dissidents comprised the majority of opposition 
actors: 
Though courageous and even heroic, Charter 77 and VONS were small and 
elitist…In theory, the dissidents’ problem was clear: how to achieve “Polish-
style” trust and mutual support among students, intelligentsia, workers, and 
the underground youth culture.  In practice, the solution proved immensely 
difficult and was not achieved until November 1989…145 
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The tactics of the opposition mainly included small and peaceful demonstrations.  This 
strategy for mobilization did not immediately inspire the general population, but over time 
the members of Charter 77 and VONS gained notoriety throughout Czechoslovakia.  
Although members of these organizations experienced frequent imprisonment146, their 
constant activity was never fully suppressed by the regime.  The contribution of these groups 
was large in comparison to membership: at the time of its ten-year anniversary, VONS had 
publicized approximately 1,000 cases of political prisoners both domestically and abroad147.  
Their experience in mobilizing and confronting the regime provided them with legitimacy 
and experience, even though Czechoslovakia never developed an enduring mobilization-
liberalization cycle.   
 As the economic conditions declined in the late 1980s, the activity of dissident groups 
increased.  Although these groups were small and comprised mainly of intelligentsia and 
youth groups, the increased activity directly influenced the collapse of the communist 
system148.  The regime’s ability to effectively interact with this small opposition group was 
limited.  Demonstrations increased drastically in 1988, and the opposition learned from their 
encounters with the regime.  In 1988, Jan Srp was released from prison after serving a two-
year sentence for leading an illegal organization.  Upon his release, Srp announced that he 
felt the regime was impotent.  A concert was held on his behalf, despite regime disapproval: 
“The concert demonstrated another point, namely that outside the main urban centers the 
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communist writ was a dead letter”149.  This event showed that the regime was incapable or 
unwilling to repress all forms mobilization.   
 The condition of the opposition in Czechoslovakia is unique from the other case 
studies.  Although a mobilization-liberalization cycle never fully developed in 
Czechoslovakia, due to frequent dissident activity a small opposition matured in the decade 
prior to transition.  The mass mobilization event that contributed to the fall of the communist 
regime created the opening needed by the dissident group to enter into talks with the regime.  
Even though neighboring countries experienced similar regime collapses, the Czechoslovak 
citizens were taken by surprise by the events in their own country.  In the cases of Bulgaria 
and Romania, spontaneous mass mobilization resulted in stolen transitions where the regime 
dictated the terms of transition.  The case of Czechoslovakia is different because while the 
mass mobilization was indeed spontaneous, a small opposition group was prepared to 
undertake negotiations.  The weakened regime was forced to capitulate as the masses united 
behind the mature opposition.   
 
Revolution and Transition 
 The fallout of the repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine took the Czechoslovak leadership 
by surprise, although the effects might have been expected, especially after regional 
communist regimes began to collapse.  Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989, President Husàk believed that the fate of his neighbors would not be realized in 
Czechoslovakia.  He maintained the belief that the Soviet Union would ultimately come to 
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the aid of his country should similar trends begin to occur150.  The effects of Gorbachev’s 
reforms were very apparent in Czechoslovakia, and the changes taking place within the 
Soviet Union closely mirrored the changes that Dubček had attempted to initiate in 1968.  
Since the political legitimacy of the regime was largely based on the conservative policy 
enacted after the Prague Spring, the advent of perestroika challenged the regime’s claim to 
power151.   
 On November 17, 1989, a group of students participating in a legal demonstration to 
honor the memory of a student killed during the Nazi occupation were violently repressed by 
the police.  The demonstration grew into a mass mobilization against the repressive policies 
of the regime and inspired a national movement unified in the desire for change.  This mass 
mobilization revealed the inability of the regime to fully suppress challenged mounted by 
opposition.  The next morning, there was a call for a general strike to take place across 
Czechoslovakia152.   
During this week, many changes took place that directly affected the ability of the 
opposition to effect change.  Vàclav Havel and other dissidents that participated in Charter 
77 and VONS formed a new organization, Civic Forum.  A similar group, Public Against 
Violence was formed in Bratislava153.  The general strike took place on Novermber 27, and 
was a major success for the new organization:  “Civic Forum demonstrated its capacity to 
disrupt the political order and thereby established itself as the legitimate spokesperson for the 
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“nation” in negotiations with the state”154.  Civic Forum was organized as an apolitical group:  
one that represented citizens against an illegitimate state155.  In this way, the organization was 
able to gain the support of the public.  The members of Civic Forum declared themselves 
immediately prepared to negotiate with the government, offering not only the promise of 
reform but also a mechanism by which to enact change156.   
Transition from communist rule in Czechoslovakia was neither an example of 
negotiation nor of a stolen transition: it is best described as regime collapse.  In the end, the 
regime had no ability or reason to negotiate:  the opposition was the “overwhelming 
relational power”157.  Linz and Stepan define regime collapse as: “…the result of rigidity, 
ossification, and loss of responsiveness of elites that does not allow them to make timely 
decisions anticipating crises and change”158.  This accurately describes the condition of the 
Czechoslovak regime prior to transition.    
During the height of mass mobilization, when regime collapse was imminent, Party 
Secretary Jakeš announced that the Communist Party had underestimated the activity of its 
enemies, but that he was nonetheless “convinced that is it….solvable, but under the 
conditions that the party go on the offensive”159.  The regime’s inability to grasp the 
seriousness of their current situation, or to recognize that their lack of action had already 
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sealed their fate indicates how removed the leadership was from reality.  At this point, the 
regime no longer held the capability to repress the mobilized masses.   
Within days, the communist leadership had resigned, and Civic Forum was invited to 
negotiations.  Vàclav Havel, whom days before the regime had refused to allow into 
negotiations, was nominated as a presidential candidate160.  Despite the absence of a 
protracted mobilization-liberalization cycle, the opposition was able to effectively negotiate a 
transition with a subsequent democratic trajectory.  Even though Czechoslovaks experienced 
a comparatively severe regime atmosphere, a small yet mature opposition developed in the 
decade preceding transition through frequent interaction with the regime.  The regime’s 
inability or unwillingness to completely repress mobilization led to the increased cost of 
repression, and the ability of the opposition to continue activity.   
 
Event Data Analysis 
 The data provided in the European Protest and Coercion Event Data set reveals that 
the opposition was extremely active throughout the decade of the 1980s.  The events describe 
a prolonged series of opposition mobilization and government repression.  Why did the 
opposition continue to mobilize despite constant repression? In this case study, the regime 
was unable or unwilling to completely suppress the movement and while the regime’s 
continued repressive response to mobilization slowed the growth of the opposition, the 
movement was never eradicated.   
 While not conforming precisely to the model, the case of Czechoslovakia shows a 
variation of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  A pattern developed where the opposition 
mobilized and the regime responded with repression, but the movement was never entirely 
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extinguished.  Therefore, the opposition was able to continue its activity, and through 
frequent mobilization, increased the cost of repression and gained respect as a legitimate 
popular movement.   When the population finally mobilized in November of 1989, a mature, 
legitimate, and coalesced opposition was prepared to assume an effective role in transition.   
 Table 4-2 shows the level of mobilization and repression from 1980 to 1989.  A major 
increase in mobilization is seen in 1988 and 1989, corresponding to the weakening of 
communist regimes across the region.  In 1988, opposition groups outside of Charter 77 
became more politically active in response to the perceived weakening of the government.  In 
1989 the repression level dropped to below 60% of mobilization for the first time in several 
years, which indicates the inability or unwillingness of the regime to meet the costs of 
repression.  The dramatic increase in mobilization participation in 1988 and 1989 is the result 
of a weakened government and inconsistent repression.   
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TABLE 4-2: Mobilization Growth 1980-1989, Czechoslovakia161 
Year Total 
Mobilization 
Events  
Total 
Repressive 
Events 
Percent of 
Repression 
compared to 
Mobilization 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
1980 2 11 550.0% 2.0 
1981 4 9 225.0% 19.0 
1982 14 4 26.7% 47.6 
1983 23 16 69.5% 366.2 
1984 18 15 83.3% 566.9 
1985162 6 5 71.4% 11.2 
1986 11 9 81.8% 12.6 
1987 12 9 75.0% 107.8 
1988 21 19 90.5% 67674.6 
1989163  92 54 58.7% 94500.4 
 
 An investigation into the events provided in the data set reveals the unique 
relationship between the opposition and the regime, but nonetheless supports the existence of 
a clear pattern of interaction.  Figure 4-1 shows the level of mobilization activity that is 
specific to the Charter 77 group.  It is important to monitor the growth of movements 
independent of Charter 77 because as independent activity increased, the regime’s attention 
was never diverted from the dissident group.  The government’s pre-occupation with 
suppressing Charter 77 allowed space for independent opposition groups to operate. 
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Figure 4-2 shows the increase in the number of mobilization events from 1987 to 
December of 1989.  The graph shows events that are specific to Charter 77 mobilization and 
events that are independent of Charter 77 activity.  As the level of mobilization increases, a 
higher percentage of events occur that are independent of Charter 77 actions.   This shows 
that the greater population is becoming more politically active.   
 
FIGURE 4-1:  Total Events and Charter 77 Events 1987-1989164 
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In 1987, half of all mobilization events were the results of actions taken by Charter 77.  
This percentage falls over the next two years: in 1988 only 19% of all mobilization events are 
sponsored by Charter 77, and in 1989, a mere 9.8% are the responsibility of this dissident 
group.  This shows a trend of increasing involvement of other opposition groups as the 
country approaches transition.  Also of interest are the statistics involving the repressive 
events.  From 1987 to 1989, the percentage of repressive events aimed directly at Charter 77 
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remained at just over 50%.  As more dissidents become politically active, the regime still 
focused most of its attention on Charter 77 activities.  This shows that many of the activities 
of non-Charter 77 members are not directly inciting repression.   
 
FIGURE 4-2:  Interaction Events Involving Charter 77165 
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A government’s choice to not respond to mobilization has a similar effect to that of 
liberalization.  When the public is not repressed for mobilization, the cost of repression is 
increased, because a precedent has been set that a certain degree of mobilization is accepted 
and does not incite repression.  By focusing a higher percentage of attention on the actions of 
Charter 77, the government allowed the political activity of other opposition groups to 
increase.   
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As the number of mobilization events increased, the number of participants per 
mobilization event also rises.  In 1987, an average of 107.8 citizens were participating in 
each reported mobilization.  In only two years, this number had increased to an average of 
94,500.4 participants per event.  This represents .60% of the population166.  Even though 
Czechoslovaks experienced a severe regime atmosphere, the absence of total repression of 
mobilization allowed for the cost of repression to increase and the cost to associate with the 
opposition to decrease.   
 
 
FIGURE 4-3:  Average Number of Participants per Mobilization Events, 
Czechoslovakia, 1987-1989167  
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Patterns of interaction between opposition and regime are apparent throughout the 
1980s in Czechoslovakia.  This variant type of mobilization-liberalization cycle shows 
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regular opposition mobilization and subsequent government repression.  There are two 
explanations for why mobilization continues even though the regime responds with 
repression.  First, there is the possibility that the repression enacted by the regime was 
incomplete:  the movement was not fully extinguished.  Evidence for this exists through the 
interaction seen between the Charter 77 dissident group and the regime.  Charter 77 regularly 
participated in mobilization events that were met with repressive responses.  Because the 
group continued to mobilize throughout the 1980s, it is evident that the government was not 
assuming the cost for complete repression.  The other explanation for why mobilization 
continued in the face of repression is that the regime did not develop habitual patterns of 
repression.  If the regime failed to respond to acts of mobilization, they inadvertently 
increased the cost to repress movements by setting a precedent that not all mobilization 
elicits a repressive response.   
 The mobilization-liberalization cycle appears in its modeled form in late 1989.  The 
following timeline depicts the development of a short, incomplete pattern.  I use the term 
incomplete to describe this cycle because by itself, this brevity of this cycle would not result 
in a mature opposition.  Because of the unique history of interaction through a variant cycle 
that existed in Czechoslovakia, a mature opposition is present and forces the destabilizing 
regime to negotiate a transfer of power.   
The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, and soon after the Czechoslovak 
government began issuing small concessions, indicating that they understood their own 
precarious position.  This display of instability triggered the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  
The first concession came in the form of an agreement to open talks on the condition of the 
environment, an issue that had been the source of ongoing protest, with increasing levels of 
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demonstrations occurring since November 12.  The timeline below shows the subsequent 
sequence of events. 
 
TIMELINE 4-1:  Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Czechoslovakia168 
CYCLE OPENS  
CATALYST  9 NOVEMBER 1989:  FALL OF BERLIN WALL 
 November 12-15: Mobilization, demonstration against air pollution 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 15:  State agrees to open environmental talks 
 November 15:  Repression, dissident sentenced for August activity 
 November 16:  Mobilization, protest against environmental damage 
 November 17-19:  Mobilization, march for political reform 
 November 17:  Mobilization, orchestra protests blacklisting of musicians who signed petitions 
 November 18:  Mobilization, march for freedom and human rights  
 November 18:  Mobilization, announce 1-week general strike against state violence 
 November 19:  Repression, Charter 77 member arrested for falsely reporting the death of a demonstrator 
 November 20-21:  Mobilization, dissident call for end of communist rule, demonstrations spread 
 November 20:  Mobilization, students hold indoor rally 
 November 20:  Mobilization, schools and colleges begin a week long sit-in 
 November 20:  Mobilization, pro-democracy demonstration 
 November 21:  Mobilization, demonstrators demand resignation of Jakes 
 November 21:  Mobilization, miners strike in support of democratic movement 
 November 21: Mobilization, protestors demand government change 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 21: Prime Minister meets with Civic Forum to discuss reform 
 November 22: Mobilization, demonstrators demand the end to communist rule 
 November 22: Mobilization, crowd chants for release of dissident, Carnogursky 
 November 22: Mobilization, candlelight vigil in Wenceslas Square 
 November 22: Mobilization, youth pro-democracy rally 
 November 22: Mobilization, students stage rally, make 12 demands 
 November 22: Mobilization, gathering to discuss environmental issues 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 22: Prime Minister meets with Civic Forum to discuss reform 
 November 22: Mobilization, democracy demonstrations 
 November 22: Mobilization, Alexander Dubček addresses crowd 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 23: Jakeš and top leaders resign 
 November 24: Mobilization, demonstration to celebrate resignation 
 November 24: Mobilization, Alexander Dubček addresses crowd 
 November 24: Mobilization, demonstrations for democracy 
 November 24: Mobilization, exiled singer returns 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 25: President Husàk pardons eight dissidents 
 November 26: Mobilization, large demonstrations in 12 cities 
 November 26: Mobilization, rally  
 November 27: Mobilization, workers engage in general 2-hour strike 
 November 27: Mobilization: march during strike 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 28: Prime Minister asks to abolish Communist Party’s leading role 
in government 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: November 28: Government agrees to separation of Church and State 
 November 30: Mobilization, students vote to continue to strike until December 2 unless demands are met 
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LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: December 3: Government brings in non-communists for first time in 20 years 
 December 4: Mobilization, protest communist domination of new government 
 December 4: Mobilization, students vote to continue to strike unless demands are met 
 December 4: Mobilization, students build wall of paper boxes around government offices 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION: December 9: President Husàk resigns upon the formation of a new 
government 
 
 
 
 The above time-line shows a very brief mobilization-liberalization cycle that begins 
with the agreement to discuss environmental issues, and ends a few weeks later with the 
resignation of the president.  The events that unfolded in this short amount of time were 
unprecedented.  The ability of the opposition to control the transition is not fully explained 
by the mobilization-liberalization model, which asserts that a prolonged cycle of interaction 
is most likely to produce a democratic trajectory.  Czechoslovakia was able to successfully 
move toward a consolidated democracy due to a variant cycle of interaction that served to 
provide the opposition with the experience and legitimacy required to take on the regime.   
 
Summary 
  
Exactly one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the harshest neo-Stalinist 
government in East Central Europe also capitulated.  While the resignation of Husàk cannot 
be seen as completely independent from the events throughout the region, the historical 
pattern of interaction between the Czechoslovak regime and opposition groups hastened his 
demise.  The two previous case studies have exemplified protracted mobilization-
liberalization cycles that served to mature the opposition groups such that they could 
effectively negotiate a change of regime.  The following two cases of Bulgaria and Romania 
show examples of increasingly harsh regime atmospheres that did not allow for the formation 
of a mobilization-liberalization cycle.  The result in these cases was a stolen transition, where 
the opposition had no power to dictate the terms of regime change.  
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 Czechoslovakia represents a unique case, where a variant cycle of interaction 
developed in the pre-transition phase due to the regime’s inability to completely eradicate 
mobilization, as well as its inconsistent response to mobilization.  Incomplete repression 
enabled the opposition to continue mobilizing in the pre-transition phase.  But, why was a 
government with a history of a severe regime atmosphere unable to completely repress a 
relatively small opposition?   
While a satisfactory answer to this question lies outside the scope of this thesis, some 
discussion is appropriate.   The nature of the opposition, which is directly related to the 
legacy of civil society and modernization, created a more developed society.  This structured 
society was better equipped to function despite the repressive nature of the regime.  For this 
reason, the opposition was incompletely and inconsistently repressed throughout the course 
of the 1980s.    
The severity of the regime atmosphere, incomplete repression of the opposition, and 
the unprecedented democratic trajectory place Czechoslovakia into a category I term as “Tier 
2”.  Czechoslovakia experienced a harsh regime atmosphere, and did not undergo a 
protracted mobilization-liberalization cycle.  However, despite these pre-transition 
characteristics, Czechoslovakia still embarked on a post-transition democratic trajectory that 
was facilitated by a mature opposition.  These results can be explained through the 
experience of the variant mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Under this pattern of interaction, 
a small opposition grew to maturity because the regime failed to consistently and completely 
suppress mobilization.  When the regime became destabilized, this group was experienced 
and united, and was thus able to negotiate a favorable transition scenario. 
  
CHAPTER 5:  BULGARIA, THE STOLEN TRANSITION 
 
Bulgaria is a case where the severity of the regime atmosphere prevented the 
development of a significant opposition movement.  The Bulgarian population had watched 
the success of other regional oppositions and strategically mobilized upon perceiving the 
destabilization of their own regime. The international demonstration effect also influenced 
the regime, which moved to obstruct opposition growth by offering terms of reform and 
transition, and prematurely ended the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  After less than two 
months of patterned opposition-regime interaction, members of the Bulgarian communist 
regime effectively “stole” the transition by promising a new and reformed government.  The 
superficiality of the reforms contributed to a post-communist authoritarian regime.     
In the years prior to 1989, Bulgaria consistently rated a “3” on the Political Terror 
Scale169, which indicates use of extensive political imprisonment, execution, murder of 
brutality for political purposes, and unlimited detention (with or without a trial) for political 
views170.  In addition, the Freedom House Rating for Bulgaria during the same time period 
indicated a consistent score of “7” for both civil liberties and political rights171.  Countries 
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that warrant a score of “7” are defined as countries with “virtually no freedom”172.  Based on 
these indicators, Bulgaria has the second most severe regime atmosphere of the countries in 
this study.  The level of repression present in the pre-transition phase did not allow for the 
development of a mobilization-liberalization cycle or a transition that favored the opposition 
or a democratic trajectory.  Bulgaria is therefore classified as a Tier 3 country.  
 
TABLE 5-1:  Regime Atmosphere Rating, Bulgaria173 
Freedom House Political Terror Scale 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Amnesty 
International 
U.S. Dept 
of State 
Total 
Score 
1987 7 7 3 3 20 
1988 7 7 3 3 20 
1989 7 7 3 3 20 
Average 3-
Year Score: 
20.00 
 
The Regime 
The communist rise to power in Bulgaria was solidified in 1947, beginning a decades-
long regime that effectively crushed political opposition, the influence of a middle class, and 
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created a state virtually isolated from western influence174.  In 1954, Todor Zhivkov rose to 
First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP)175, a 
position he would hold until party members organized to usurp power in 1989.  Zhivkov 
created a highly repression regime atmosphere, which did not allow for significant opposition 
growth.   
The Bulgarian leadership experienced greater stability in comparison to other East 
European communist regimes, which can be attributed to the BCP’s consistent historical 
response to dissent and the high levels of repression used to prevent mobilization.  The 
combination of these two factors created no political space for opposition movements to form 
or grow.  When the socialist regime was established in Bulgaria in the 1940s, there were 
massive purges of non-communist elite which resulted in 2,730 politicians being sentenced to 
death in 1944 and 1945.  An estimated 200,000 citizens were executed without trial within 
two months in 1944176.  This set a very clear precedent that alternatives to socialism would 
not be tolerated in Bulgaria.   
 In addition, the Bulgarian communist regime was closely associated with Bolshevik 
ideology.  This style of rule created a situation where dissidents “were more like the Soviet 
type of individual intellectuals exercising “single-man protest” than the Polish or Czech 
examples of organized action”177.  Zhivkov achieved regime stability by correlating his 
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regime as closely as possible to his Soviet counterparts178.   He enhanced this stability by 
“heaping rewards and honors on compliant intellectuals”179 in order to prevent organized 
dissent.  These characteristics of rule contributed to the severity of the regime atmosphere 
and the improbability that a prolonged mobilization-liberalization cycle would develop.   
 While Zhivkov’s steadfast support of the Soviet Union bolstered his power during the 
Brezhnev era, the reform that swept over the USSR as a result of Gorbachev’s perestroika 
reforms weakened the stability of his regime.    Because Zhivkov had been so adamant about 
following the leadership in Moscow, he was unable to distance himself entirely from 
Gorbachev’s reforms.  In 1987, Zhivkov was pressured into introducing perestroika-inspired 
reforms in Bulgaria.  These new policies became known as the “July Concept”, and 
incorpated change in the forms of administrative and economic reorganization, greater 
freedom for the press, and experimentation with multi-candidate elections.  In short, these 
reforms were aimed at introducing elements of political democracy180.  The ideas of media 
independence and partially democratic elections were soon recanted, but the experiment 
damaged the stability of the regime.   
 Circles of dissent within Bulgaria, especially Sofia, became more prominent and 
Zhivkov was forced to employ historical methods to prevent the organization of a substantial 
opposition movement.  However, the declining stability of the regime had opened new 
opportunities for an opposition: “members of the Bulgarian intelligentsia dared to launch 
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initiatives that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier”181.  The effects of 
perestroika robbed the regime of legitimacy.   
 Other events were simultaneously weakening the ability of the regime to enact 
repression.  As with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria was a signatory to the 1975 Helsinki 
Agreements and was bound by international law to protect human rights182.  As the 
opposition became emboldened through the decreasing stability of the regime, human rights 
emerged as a point of contention.   
Bulgarians were also very aware of regional instability and the successes of the 
demonstrations across Eastern Europe.   For the regime, these changes prompted splitting 
within the elite as a strategy to maintain power by promising reform and new leadership.  On 
November 10, 1987, the day after the Berlin Wall fell, Zhivkov “resigned” from his position 
as President of Bulgaria.  This event revealed the instability of the regime to the awakening 
opposition, and touched off a mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Zhivkov’s resignation was 
soon revealed as an involuntary act.  Several days later, his son became the center of a 
corruption investigation, and friends and relatives were purged from the party183.  The effects 
of the regional changes weighed heavily on the Bulgarian regime.  The BCP ousted Zhivkov 
in order to maintain legitimacy and prospects for controlling the inevitable transition.   
 The international events also affected the opposition, giving them hope that they too 
could achieve change.  Unfortunately for Bulgarian citizens, the severity of the regime 
atmosphere prior to transition had not allowed for the maturation of an opposition capable of 
negotiating a favorable transition.  The mobilization-liberalization cycle in Bulgaria 
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developed late and never came to fruition.  Instead, the “reformed” elites negotiated a change 
of leadership that re-installed many members of the old regime and successfully halted the 
developing mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Bulgaria represents a case where the elites 
stole the transition opportunity from an adolescent opposition.   
 
The Opposition 
 The development of opposition groups in Bulgaria closely followed the three major 
social issues that plagued the region in the 1980s: workers’ unrest, environmental concern, 
and ethnic conflict.  Due to the severity of the regime atmosphere in Bulgaria, opposition 
movements were largely unorganized until the late 1980s, and were heavily influenced by the 
international demonstration effect.   
The main voice of discontent in Bulgaria was the intelligentsia, who sparked 
movements that promoted basic human rights and the health of the environment184.  It wasn’t 
until early 1989 that the first Balkan independent trade union was established.  Podkrepa, or 
“Support” was modeled after Solidarity and became the first mass movement185 in 
Bulgaria186.  Another influential opposition movement devoted to improving environmental 
conditions emerged in Bulgaria in the late 1980s.  Ekoglastnost became the first opposition 
group within Bulgaria to coordinate public protests187.   These groups never gained 
widespread influence over the population.  The political atmosphere was so limiting, that 
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even up until Zhikov’s resignation the leaders of the opposition groups were doubtful that the 
movement would remain in existence188. 
The late-forming opposition movements in Bulgaria were a result of the severe 
regime atmosphere and proved to be a hindrance to a post-transition democratic trajectory.  
The lack of opposition development in Bulgaria was a legacy of its communist past.  Any 
social power that had existed within the stratifications of Bulgarian society prior to 1944 was 
completely wiped out when the communists consolidated power in 1947189.  Bulgaria was 
effectively cut off from more modern influences and existed in isolation until the late 1980s.  
Compared with other transitioning countries in the region, Bulgaria experienced significantly 
fewer mobilization events in 1989:  “Since power is always relational, this weakness of the 
democratic opposition enhanced the capacity of the non-democratic regime”190.  With the 
advent of perestroika, new opportunities emerged for opposition groups, but the methods of 
mobilization were unorganized and sporadic.   
The group that ultimately represented the opposition at the roundtable talks was 
organized only in December of 1989, a month after the resignation of Zhivkov and a month 
prior to the beginning of the roundtable.  United Democratic Forces (UDF) developed 
quickly as an umbrella organization, combining approximately 50 small organizations191 into 
a coalition192.  Fourteen of these groups were incorporated into the roundtable talks, but the 
lack of maturity of the delegation was obvious: “In civic culture terms…these opposition 
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groups hardly qualify as interest groups or political parties within a pluralist society.  During 
the forty years of communist party domination, dissention groups were repressed.  
Intellectuals and other individual dissidents…had an impact, but that was very different from 
organized opposition”193.  Because the opposition forces had been so stunted during 
communist rule, the UDF was unable to gain widespread support during its short existence.  
It had little legitimacy and no renown.  In order to bolster its position, the UDF resorted to 
organizing mass demonstrations during the roundtable talks194.   
The timing of the Bulgarian transition favored the regime, which had been able to set 
the stage for “negotiations”.  The opposition gained impressive momentum in their short 
existence, but were unable to gain the legitimacy, experience or support required to 
effectively negotiate a transition to democracy.  The UDF was weak and fragmented during 
the roundtables, and lost what little power they had through increasing disunity.  They lost 
both the 1990 and 1994 elections, but the opposition movement nevertheless survived195.  
Civil society continued to gain strength as the transition unfolded: “The most intense 
explosion of opposition in civil society occurred after, not before, the election, and for a 
while the streets seemed to displace the parliament as the center of politics”196.  The opening 
of society allowed for the growth and maturity of an opposition.  In the years to come, civil 
society would become much more effective in demanding democratic change.   
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Transition 
 The catalyst that began the mobilization-liberalization cycle was the forced 
resignation of Zhivkov, which indicated that the elites were split and that the president had 
lost political legitimacy and the support of his party.  At this point in time the regime already 
had a plan for transition, and it did not include incorporating the materializing demands of 
the citizens of Bulgaria.  The uprisings that were taking place across Eastern Europe gave the 
Bulgarian elites the luxury of preparation.  It was obvious that the event changes taking place 
across the Eastern bloc could potentially spill over into Bulgaria. The elites preempted any 
attempt by the opposition to control the terms of negotiation by opting to reform before being 
forced out of power.   
The Foreign Minister, Petar Mladenov relayed to Zhivkov that he had no choice but 
to resign, as the BCP was prepared to vote for his removal197.  Although Zhivkov and some 
of his closest associates were removed from office, the majority of the leadership remained 
intact198.  Mladenov was chosen to replace Zhivkov, and moved quickly to enact reform that 
the public would accept.  The elections were scheduled one month later, giving the 
opposition no time to prepare.  The changes that the opposition had hoped for did not occur.  
Mladenov remained a communist dedicated to the ideology of the party199.   
The regime change in Bulgaria was effectively a coup initiated by members of the 
BCP.  The party leaders wanted reform, and knew that economic troubles combined with the 
regional events were jeopardizing their ability to stay in power.  They “preferred reform and 
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self-preservation to confrontation and possible defeat and banishment from politics 
altogether”200, and therefore initiated change from within.  This illusion of reform “bought 
time” for the regime, but ultimately failed as a method of maintaining power.  The nascent 
opposition grew as a result of these reforms and later developed the capabilities to confront 
the illegitimate regime.   
The roundtable talks lasted from January 22 to May 14, 1990201.  The opposition used 
what little leverage they had to achieve small demands such as the publication of their own 
newspaper, a building in which to conduct business, and access to radio and television media.  
Their largest achievement was the incorporation of a bill of rights202.  In addition, the 
opposition was able to secure the Grand National Election Act, which allowed for universal 
suffrage and secret ballots, and the right to join a political party without penalty or 
privilege203.   Despite these gains, the regime was the ultimate beneficiary of the negotiation 
process.  The communists successfully negotiated terms that guaranteed their return to power 
and prolonged the road to democracy.   
 
 Event Data Analysis 
 The event data for Bulgaria depicts an irregular pattern of interaction throughout the 
early and mid 1980s.  While there is evidence of opposition mobilization, the movements 
were small and isolated, and did not gain momentum or national attention.  As was described 
earlier, no large and organized opposition group existed within Bulgaria prior to 1989, a 
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characteristic which is supported by the event data.  The consequences for mobilization kept 
the cost to associate with the opposition high and the cost to repress low.  This resulted in an 
unchanging political environment for the majority of the decade preceding transition.    
 
TABLE 5-2: Mobilization Growth 1980-1989, Bulgaria204 
Year Total 
Mobilization 
Events  
Total 
Repressive 
Events 
Percent of 
Repression 
compared to 
Mobilization 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
1980 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1981 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1982 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1983 1 0 0.0% 0.0 
1984 2 1 50.0% 31.0 
1985 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1986 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1987 1 0 0.0% 12.0 
1988 1 4 400.0% 31.0 
1989  37 6 16.2% 11,522.4 
 
 Table 5-2 shows the number of reported events that transpired in each year from 1980 
to 1989.  The intensity of these cases varies, from bombings in protest to communism and 
strikes demanding better wages to political demonstrations and hunger strikes.  In 1989, the 
increase in mobilization is notable, with demonstrations growing in number throughout the 
year.  In the years before 1989, the number of mobilization participants is negligible.  In 
1989, however, the average size of each reported event is 11,522.4 participants.  This number 
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represents .13% of the total estimated population205 for Bulgaria at the time206.  This shows 
that even at its peak, the pre-transition opposition force was comparatively small207.   
Figure 5-1 shows the number of reported concessions in addition to the number of 
mobilization and repression events.  Most noteworthy is the number of political concessions 
that are offered by the regime in 1989.  An unprecedented 17 examples of concession are 
provided, compared with only two from the previous four years.  Each one of these 
concessions took place after September 5, 1989.  This illustrates the brevity of the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle in Bulgaria and the immaturity of the opposition, both 
which are direct consequences of the severity of the regime atmosphere.   
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FIGURE 5-1: Bulgaria: Events per Year, 1984-1989208 
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 Timeline 5-1 depicts the mobilization-liberalization cycle in Bulgaria.  The cycle is 
triggered upon the forced resignation of Zhivkov, which indicated to the public that the 
regime was destabilizing.  The cycle is prematurely halted in January of 1990, when the 
regime agrees to negotiate with a weak opposition in order to ensure that the communists 
maintain power after transition.   
 
TIMELINE 5-1:  Mobilization-Liberalization Cycle in Bulgaria, 1989-1990209 
Cycle Opens 
 CATALYST: ZHIVKOV RESIGNS AS PRESIDENT OF BULGARIA November 10, 1989 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 13: State prosecutor sends ban law of protest groups back to 
Supreme Court 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 16: Ekoglasnost is legalized; dissident members of BCP are 
reinstated 
 LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 17: Hardliners are purged from Politburo and Secretariat 
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 November 17, Rally: youths tear up pictures of Zhivkov; demand end to police state 
 LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 17: Parliament decriminalizes protests and grants full amnesty to 
political prisoners 
November 18-19, Demonstration: Citizens seek democracy, reform, and punishment of Zhivkov 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 21: BCP promises a Central Committee meeting to investigate 
Zhivkov’s corruption 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, November 26: State disbands the secret police and decriminalizes protest 
 November 29- December 1, Strike: Prisoners occupy mines, refuse to work 
 December 4, Demonstration: Dissidents demand end to BCP’s monopoly control of the state 
 December 7, Demonstration and Petition: Religious groups seek religious holidays and religious schools 
 December 7, Mobilization: Formation meeting of Union of Democratic Forces 
 December 9, Demonstration: UDF demands democratic reform 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 9: UDF ousts Zhivkov from Central Committee of BCP 
 December 10, Demonstration: UDF demands end to BCP’s monopoly control of the state 
 December 10, Demonstration: UDF demands free speech and the right to assemble 
 LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 11: BCP promises free elections and end to monopoly control 
 December 11-12, Demonstration: UDF holds candlelight march for democratic reform 
 LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 11: Ekoglasnost is certified as an organization 
 December 14, Demonstration: UDF calls for democracy now; end BCP monopoly control 
 December 14, Demonstration: Students gather on steps of legislature demanding reform 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 15: President asks for June elections 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 15: BCP promises to end its monopoly in one month 
 December 15, Demonstration: UDF marches to TV station to protest coverage of a rally as extremist 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 15: State agrees to roundtable talks 
 December 16, Demonstration: UDF demands the right to go on TV 
 December 24, Demonstration: UDF demands speed of reform and democracy 
 December 25, Demonstration: Christmas mass held for democratic reform 
 December 27, Strike: UDF sponsors a warning strike to start reform talks 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, December 27: BCP agrees to immediate reform talks in response to  the 
warning strike 
 December 31, Rally: Mass for democratic reform 
LIBERALIZING CONCESSION, January 3, 1990:  Roundtable talks begin between BCP and UDF 
 
 
 The event data shows a period of fifty-four days of a discernable mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  This brief period of opposition activity was in response to the 
resignation of Zhivkov and sparked an intense period of mobilization.  The regime’s response 
to the mobilization was to offer liberalizing concessions.  The cost to repress the movement 
increased rapidly throughout the months of November and December.  In order to prevent the 
opposition from gaining strength, the regime agreed to begin negotiations in order to ensure 
that they would maintain power.  This strategy was in response to what the elites had learned 
from the examples of their neighbors: it was imperative to negotiate before the opposition 
posed an insurmountable threat.    
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 The case of Bulgaria is different from other East Central European cases that have 
been discussed due to the severity of the regime atmosphere.  Because the opposition was not 
able to form a cohesive movement until late 1989, and then only in response to the effects of 
the opposition movements throughout the Eastern bloc region, the length of the mobilization-
liberalization cycle was short and ineffective to the opposition.   
The opposition had neither the experience nor a cohesive plan with which to assume 
active leadership following the transition.  Remnants of the former regime were able to steal 
the transition by enacting superficial reform that was not conducive to a post-transition 
democratic trajectory.  Whereas a mature opposition would have had better capability to 
negotiate a transition that served its needs, the UDF was yet undeveloped and incapable of 
using the roundtable to their full advantage.   
 
Summary 
 Bulgaria is rated as a Tier 3 country because the severity of its regime atmosphere 
precluded the development of a complete mobilization-liberalization cycle and a mature 
opposition.  The severity of the regime atmosphere in the pre-transition phase precluded the 
development of an opposition.  Small opposition groups only began forming in the late 1980s.  
In Tier 1 and 2 countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, mature oppositions contributed 
to the country’s democratic trajectory.  In Bulgaria however, the UDF formed in a matter of 
weeks in late 1989, and although it encompassed the major opposition groups it was 
extremely limited in its ability to function as a legitimate negotiating body.  Furthermore, the 
change of regime had already taken place by the time “negotiations” were initiated.   
  
 
110 
The reforms that were implemented were the result of the internal coup:  “…the early 
post-totalitarian regime in Bulgaria initiated and never lost control of the transition and…the 
leaders of that regime emerged from the first free elections not only with a plurality of the 
vote but with a newly reconstituted claim to power”210.  The differentiation in power between 
the regime and nascent opposition did not allow for a democratic trajectory.   The severity of 
the regime atmosphere and the pre-transition pattern of interaction led to ineffective 
“negotiations” and compromised the path to democratic consolidation.   
Although Bulgaria did experience a distinct mobilization-liberalization cycle, its 
progress was halted by the strategic moves of the elite.  The regime agreed to negotiations 
within fifty-four days of the resignation of Zhivkov, not allowing enough time for the 
opposition to mature into an organized and coalesced force.  The regime benefited 
immediately from the negotiation, but the opening of civil society as a result of increased 
opposition-regime interaction allowed the opposition movement to strengthen and eventually 
achieve democratic reform.   
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CHAPTER 6:  ROMANIA, THE STOLEN REVOLUTION 
 
 
 Romania is designated as a Tier 3 country because its severe regime atmosphere 
precluded the development of a complete mobilization-liberalization cycle, and therefore of a 
mature opposition.  Romania experienced the most severe regime atmosphere of all the 
countries in this study.  The regime atmosphere score of 20.33 is an average score derived 
from Freedom House and the Political Terror Scale.  Romania consistently scored a “7” in 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties, indicating that throughout the pre-transition phase 
political rights were nonexistent due to the severe repression the population experienced 
under the regime211.  Romania’s roundtable sessions were held from 27 January 1990 to 1 
February 1990212.  They were the last roundtable sessions to begin and spanned a mere six 
days213.   
Like Bulgaria, Romania’s transition is an example of a stolen transition, where the 
immature opposition did not benefit from the experience of a prolonged mobilization-
liberalization cycle.  Members of the ancien regime were able to quickly fill the political void 
left after the removal and execution of President Nicolae Ceauşescu.  These “reformed” 
communists convinced the nascent opposition that they would embark on a new democratic 
course.  The trajectory for Romania was instead a prolonged path to democracy. 
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TABLE 6-1: Regime Atmosphere Rating, Romania214 
 
Freedom House Political Terror Scale 
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Amnesty 
International 
U.S. Dept 
of State 
Total 
Score 
1987 7 7 3 3 20 
1988 7 7 2 3 19 
1989 7 7 4 4 22 
Average 3-
Year Score: 
20.33 
 
 
The Regime and Political Decay 
 
 In the case of Romania, the “regime” is defined by the ruler, and not by the 
communist party.  Nicolae Ceauşescu (r. 1964-1989) held the ultimate authority in Romania 
throughout his reign.  He created a neo-Stalinist type government, complete with a 
personality cult and intermittent party purges, highly reminiscent of the infamous dictator.  
This style of dictatorship had consequences for the elite and the population.  Ceauşescu met 
any challenges to the regime with harsh repression, and did not allow an environment where 
an opposition capable of forcing the regime to negotiate could successfully mobilize.  
Whereas in some previous cases, the waning legitimacy of a regime opened itself to 
challenge by opposition movements, the case of Romania is starkly different.  No opposition 
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group would overcome the regime’s threshold of tolerance for the cost of repressions, even 
though the regime clearly lacked popular support and political legitimacy.   
 Two elements distinguish the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu.  The first main 
characteristic of his leadership is the inequality that existed between the elite and the 
population (and eventually between Ceauşescu and the elite), which allowed him to maintain 
a monopoly of power.  The relationship between the low cost of repression and the high 
levels of inequality led to a scenario where Ceauşescu could safely engage in repression over 
a long period of time without the threat of overt challenges from the population to his regime.   
The second is the weakness of political institution, which allowed him to rule over the 
masses directly, without the legitimate institutions characteristic of de jure governance.  The 
absence of concrete political institutions helped Ceauşescu climb to his position of authority, 
but ultimately contributed to his demise because his regime lacked the legitimacy that is 
traditionally provided by institutions.  Weak political institutions relegated the population to 
a “ ‘parochial’, passive, and ignorant” existence215, stunting their ability to mobilize.  Unlike 
the case of Czechoslovakia, where the legacy of modernization allowed critical aspects of 
civil society to survive severe repression, the lack of Westernization in Romania inhibited the 
survival of independent elements of society. 
 In order to fully understand the position of power held by Nicolae Ceauşescu by the 
1980s and the subsequent lack of opposition development, it is necessary to understand the 
major events that defined his leadership.  Ceauşescu set several liberalizing precedents in the 
early days of his dictatorship including the encouragement of de-Stalinization policies, which 
in effect lessened the repressive nature of the Securitate.  He soon became acutely aware that 
such liberalizing policy would serve to destabilize the regime, and responded with repression 
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in order to stabilize the position of the elite and to crush any moves to consolidate dissident 
activity216.  Ceauşescu revealed his strength as General Secretary by responding to challenges 
with increased repression, to include enhancing the rituals surrounding his cult leadership, 
and purging members of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP)217.  Ceauşescu refused to 
allow any sort of dissent, even from within the ranks of the party, and thus isolated the 
political elite and divided the party.   
 The power of a dictatorship is based on the support it receives from security forces, 
and whether or not those forces are available to respond to a challenge218.  In 1974 Ceauşescu 
created the office of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, a move that 
eliminated the post of the office of President of the State Council.  Since the President of the 
State Council had previously controlled the Romanian Army, this move effectively placed 
the role of Commander in Chief of the Romanian Army under the new office of the President.   
After appointing himself President, Ceauşescu now controlled the armed forces of Romania, 
and consolidated his monopoly of power219.  As long as the security forces and the military 
continued to support him, Ceauşescu would maintain complete authority.   
 Ceauşescu adopted a Stalinist approach to the management of both the economy and 
society.  In doing this, he further alienated the leadership of the RCP.  In addition to 
weakening his party, Ceauşescu destroyed the economy, causing extreme pressure on the 
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population.  As other East European economies slowly began to integrate, Romania’s became 
increasingly isolated220.  Ceauşescu wanted Romania to become completely self-sufficient 
and thus focused much of his economic attention on eliminating foreign debt, which drove 
the population into mass poverty: “This absurd economic approach, along with the pursuit of 
large-scale projects…caused extreme economic strain on the population…”221.  The 
culmination of these stresses and then increasing inquality led to insurrection in 1989. 
 The economic situation was exacerbated by Ceauşescu’s political legacy.  While early 
on in his career he gained the respect of the Western world for refusing to be a puppet of 
Moscow, he later lost this position of prestige: “Until the early 1980s and especially until the 
beginning of perestroika in the USSR, Ceauşescu was able to use his “exceptionalism” as an 
argument in favor of his political option.  Political decay in the late 1980s and the 
intensification of international pressures on Romania contributed to the weakening of 
Ceauşescu’s power”222.  In consolidating his own position as supreme leader, Ceauşescu 
disenfranchised the party apparatus that afforded him his position of power.   
His cult leadership greatly weakened the RCP, to the point on incompetence223.  
Appointments were made based on loyalty and not on qualifications.  In the end, the party 
which Ceauşescu would rely upon to save his life crumbled beneath him as it was based on 
coercion and not legitimacy.  The party apparatus was increasingly subjected to threats by the 
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Securitate as a measure to eliminate dissention.  This style of leadership led to a stability 
crisis as economic conditions deteriorated, and the party became ideologically factioned.   
 
 
 
Popular Resistance 
 
 Just as the elite suffered from the lack of government structure in the form of political 
institution, the population was unable to organize itself in protest for the same reasons.  
There was no way for the population to participate in any sort of political activity because the 
opportunity for such activity did not exist224.  The absence of viable political institution 
prolonged Ceauşescu’s tenure in office, but also contributed to his violent demise.   
 Any popular movements that appeared during the Ceausescu regime were met with 
extreme repressive retaliation.  In 1977, Jiu Valley miners participated in a spontaneous 
working class movement that gained attention and concession from the government.  What 
could have been a landmark victory for the masses became another failure, as the 
concessions granted were immediately repealed after the miners returned to work.  Harsh 
repression ensued to guarantee that such an uprising would not again occur225.  As political 
institution generally was absent in Romania, the concessions granted by the government held 
no promise of future policy and therefore were meaningless226.  The lack of de jure existence 
made it unlikely that concessions in response to this movement would hold any future sway.  
The strike did, however, temporarily increase the cost of repression for the Ceauşescu regime, 
and it responded with concessions.  However, because the concessions never gained a de jure 
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existence, once the pressure was removed from the government, the cost of repressions again 
decreased and the concessions gained were eliminated and new waves of repression were 
introduced. 
 The following table depicts historical examples of oppositional challenges to the 
regime.  Very few examples of such challenges exist, justifying the lack of development of a 
mobilization-liberalization cycle in Romania.   
 
TABLE 6-2:  Challenges to the Romanian Regime227 
 
Challenge Consequences 
1977 Jiu Valley Miner Movement - Miners temporarily gain concessions; 
- Lack of a de jure system gives the concessions no 
future existence 
- Once pressure to the regime is relieved (miners 
return to work) sever repression ensures228 
November 1987 Braşov Demonstration -Thousands protest, images of Ceauşescu burned229 
March 1989, Letter of the Six -Six party members write letter to Ceauşescu , 
express discontent 
- Authors placed under house arrest 
- Repressive policy increases230  
December 1989, Tişamoara -Thousands protest in solidarity with Lazlo Tökes 
- Government responds with armed violence, 
approximately 2000 civilians are killed 231 
 
 The other major event of mobilization came from within the echelons of the RCP.  In 
November of 1987, six party members (including two previous General Secretaries) authored 
a letter to Ceauşescu: “denouncing his excesses, his erratic economic policies, and the 
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general deterioration of Romania’s international image”232.  The six party members were 
placed under house arrest, but refused to withdraw their statements.  This event shows the 
high level of internal discontent over Ceauşescu’s leadership, but also his declining 
capabilities.  He was powerless to make the party members retract their statements, but he 
also was unable or unwilling to enact a harsh punishment.   
 
Revolution 
 The eventual consequence of the growing instability of the Ceauşescu regime, which 
included a void of legitimacy and widening divisions between Ceauşescu and the RCP, was a 
spontaneous insurrection initiated by the population and stolen by the party elite.  A popular 
mobilization that began as a protest in Timişoara was countered with government violence 
that resulted in the deaths of 2000 civilians.  This unrest extended into mass protest in 
Bucharest that led to the violent overtaking of the Central Committee building and the 
subsequent flight of Ceauşescu.   
The president summoned his defense minister and ordered the army to counter with 
deadly force.  The defense minister refused to comply, and was immediately shot dead by a 
Securitate agent233.  This act marked the end of the army’s allegiance to Ceauşescu, and thus 
the end of his reign.  Within days the army leadership was calling on loyalists to surrender, 
and began arresting members of the Securitate.  Without the protection of the security forces, 
Ceauşescu’s regime no longer carried any sway.  The president and his wife were captured, 
given an illegal trial, and immediately executed by members of his own party234. 
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The party elite were able to obtain control over the revolution because opposition 
only existed in a nascent state, and were not capable of organizing to assume leadership.  
Posing as a surrogate government, the party elite under the National Salvation Front (NSF) 
usurped power and began rule as a new authoritarian regime.  But just as its predecessor had 
lacked legitimacy as an authoritarian government, the NSF also lacked such legitimacy and 
eventually fell to the mature opposition in the watershed elections of 1996.   
 
Event Data Analysis 
 The severe regime atmosphere in the pre-transition phase greatly inhibited the ability 
of the Romanian public to develop an opposition.  A mobilization-liberalization cycle may 
develop in repressed societies when the population perceives that the regime has become 
destabilized.  In the case of Romania, the regime was unstable, but the society was repressed 
to the extent that no overt opposition was capable of mobilization.  The major mobilization 
events that led to the fall of Ceauşescu occurred in December of 1989, just days before the 
regime toppled.   
 Evidence of a mobilization-liberalization cycle is not explicitly present.  The 
following timeline depicts the events of December 1989: 
 
TIMELINE 6-1: Timeline of Events in Romania, December 1989235 
17 December, Mobilization: Demonstration against the eviction of a Priest 
17 December, Mobilization:  Riot after protest 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: December 17: Security forces murder protestors, 16 dead 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: December 17: State seals all national borders 
18 December, Mobilization:  Riot 
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 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: December 18: State blocks off Timişoara with armored vehicles 
19 December, Mobilization: Riot 
GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: December 19: State deploys army to prevent dissident action 
20 December, Mobilization: Riot and clash with police 
20 December, Mobilization:  March for the return of the dead bodies 
20 December, Mobilization: Dissidents occupy chemical plant, threaten to blow it up 
GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: State of emergency declared in Timis district, curfew enforced 
Defection, 20 December  Army units stop repressing, some join opposition movement 
21 December, Mobilization: Riot and clash with police 
Defection: 21 December: Army clashes with security forces 
21 December, Mobilization: Dissidents occupy factories 
21 December, Mobilization: Issue ultimatum, threaten to blow up chemical factory 
21 December, Mobilization: Heckle Ceauşescu at pro-government televised speech 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: Security forces shoot at protestors, 50 killed 
21 December, Mobilization: Students and dissidents demonstrate across the country (Bucharest, Sibiu, Arad) 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: Security forces use tanks and tear gas against protestors 
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: Security forces fire at protestors in Cluj and Tirgu Mures, 40 killed 
Defense Minister Commits Suicide236: December 21 
22 December, Mobilization:  Bucharest workers strike against the regime  
 GOVERNMENT REPRESSION: Politburo declares national state of emergency 
22 December, Mobilization:  Dissidents demonstrate against the regime 
Defection: 22 December, Army fights loyalist security forces 
Defection: 22 December, Ceauşescu is deposed, NSF assumes leadership 
 
 
 The remaining days of December 1989 are characterized by chaotic interaction 
between loyalist forces and elements of defected military and party members.  Opposition 
forces from within the population ended their weeklong effort of mobilization on December 
23.  Within three days of being ousted, Ceauşescu and his wife were tried and executed by 
the National Salvation Front.   
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TABLE 6-3: Mobilization Growth 1980-1989, Romania237 
Year Total 
Mobilization 
Events  
Total 
Repressive 
Events 
Percent of 
Repression 
compared to 
Mobilization 
Average 
Number of 
Participants 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
1980 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1981 8 0 0.0% 267.3 
1982 2 0 0.0% 3.0 
1983 0 0 0.0% 0.0 
1984 1 0 0.0% 1.0 
1985 1 0 0.0% 1.0 
1986 1 2 200.0% 200.0 
1987 3 3 100.0% 36,678.3 
1988 1 1 100.0% 22.0 
1989238  16 28 175.0% 22,808.6 
 
The evidence from the data event set shows no sign of the development of a 
mobilization-liberalization cycle of interaction.  In fact, throughout the ten year period of 
1980 to 1990, only two events of concession are reported239.  Both took place in December of 
1987, when the government increased wages and meat rations.  Every other reported event of 
government response is in the form of repression.  As Table 6-2 shows, the number of events 
of repression outnumbered mobilization events from 1986 through 1989, indicating the 
tremendous cost of association and the willingness of the regime to meet the cost of 
repression.  The Romanian regime is arguably unstable throughout the late 1980s, due to the 
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lack of political infrastructure, declining economy, and the polarized RCP.  Why then, were 
opposition forces unable to capitalize on perceived events of instability?   
This question is partially answered through considering the lack of modernization and 
structure of society within Romania.  These conditions allowed the Romanian government to 
completely repress the population, whereas countries which experienced elements of 
modernization showed scenarios where the government could not completely repress 
oppositions.  The severity of the regime atmosphere in Romania led to an extreme power 
differentiation that favored the regime.  No organized opposition ever surfaced that could 
effectively confront the instable regime.  At the peak of the mass uprising in December of 
1989, the average demonstration size was 10,868.6 participants, or only .04% of the 
population240.  Not only was the movement completely unorganized and without defined 
goals, but it was also small compared to the size of the greater population. 
 A mobilization-liberalization cycle never developed in Romania.  I argue that this is 
due to the severity of the regime atmosphere in the pre-transition phase, and is not a 
reflection of the stability of the government.  The unstable government was able to maintain 
a position of power because the level of inequality remained high and the cost to repress 
remained low.  The ability of Ceauşescu to control the Romanian Army up until the point of 
insurrection allowed the costs of repression to remain low.  The army and the Securitate 
forces served as a visible deterrent to organization and mobilization.  The accumulation of 
repressive responses to disobedience kept any opposition in a dormant and undeveloped state.   
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Summary  
The events of December 1989 revealed the instability of the regime, and possibly 
could have sparked the beginning of a mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Romania is a unique 
case from others in this study because the splitting of the RCP had a very different effect on 
the outcome if the insurrection.  In countries such as Hungary, the reformed factions of the 
MSZMP sided with a mature opposition during the transition phase.  In Romania, those who 
called themselves reformers usurped power without any cooptation of the opposition.  This 
happened for two reasons.  First, the regime had already toppled, and there was no need for 
the “reformers” to co-opt the opposition.  Realistically, there was no organized or mature 
opposition to speak of, and certainly not one that held any popular legitimacy or political 
sway.  Second, history shows us that the National Salvation Front can hardly be called a 
group of reformers.  The previously disenfranchised RCP members saw their chance for a 
real opportunity to gain power.  The result was a new authoritarian regime that was stolen 
from the hands of the population.  The intense mobilization of December 1989 revealed the 
instability of the regime, and the NSF used the unrest fueled by a discontented population to 
its advantage.  Had the regime atmosphere allowed for the maturation of the opposition 
through a mobilization-liberalization cycle, the ability of the NSF to claim authority would 
have been diminished.  Romania is classified as a Tier 3 country: the lack of such a cycle of 
interaction set Romania on divergent trajectory toward a stabilized government, and 
prolonged democratic consolidation.   
 
 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The mobilization-liberalization cycle models pre-transition opposition-regime 
interaction.  The case studies have shown that in countries where a comparatively mild 
regime atmosphere existed, protracted mobilization-liberalization cycles developed that 
served to mature an opposition.  Mature oppositions were best prepared to negotiate a 
transition agreement with the communist regime.   
 Several factors affected the stages of the mobilization-liberalization cycle.  Each 
cycle was triggered by a perceived event of regime destabilization.  This instability created 
an opportunity for increased opposition activity because the regime’s ability to repress 
decreased.  If the opposition decided that the risks associated with mobilization outweighed 
the potential risk of repression, they may have opted to mobilize.  The regime, in turn, was 
forced to choose a response to the mobilization event.   
 If the regime determined that it was capable of fully repressing the movement and 
was willing to assume the costs associated with repression, they may have opted to repress.  
However, in the case that the regime incompletely repressed the mobilization, neglected to 
respond to the mobilization, or offered a liberalizing concession in response to the 
mobilization, the cost to repress increased.  By opting to liberalize, the regime calculated that 
it could not assume the cost of repression at that moment in time.  The choice to liberalize 
showed that the regime attempted to relieve the pressure from the opposition by meeting 
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some of the demands.  The consequence of the successive liberalizing concessions that took 
place during a mobilization-liberalization cycle was an increasingly liberal environment and 
a mature opposition. 
 My examples of Tier 1 countries are Hungary and Poland.  These two countries 
showed comparatively mild regime atmospheres, the presence of mobilization-liberalization 
cycles, and democratic trajectories.  The longest mobilization-liberalization cycle of this 
investigation occurred in Hungary, where the opposition developed over the course of 17 
months.  During this time, mobilization was consistently met with liberalizing concessions, 
and the growing opposition achieved effective negotiations that resulted in a democratic 
trajectory.  The leniency of the regime atmosphere was in part due to the presence of elite 
factions.  This instability ultimately provided the catalyst for the mobilization-liberalization 
cycle.   
 In the case of Poland, the opposition was matured through a previous cycle of 
interaction, but the movement was interrupted by the imposition of martial law.  Once the 
international constraints were removed, the opposition was able to drive the regime to 
negotiate even though it lacked its pre-martial law strength and cohesion.  The instability of 
the Polish regime was evident through its lack of commitment to communist ideology and its 
inability to effectively manage the country’s economy policy.  A brief mobilization-
liberalization cycle developed, and the opposition was quickly able to bring the regime to 
negotiate. 
 The only Tier 2 case in this investigation is Czechoslovakia, which encompasses 
characteristics of both Tier 1 and Tier 3 countries.  Czechoslovakia’s post-transition 
democratic trajectory suggests the presence of a mild regime atmosphere in the pre-transition 
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phase.   However, the regime atmosphere score for Czechoslovakia indicates that it was in 
fact severe.  The event data analysis shows that because of incomplete repression, the 
opposition movement consistently interacted with the regime, and was matured through this 
process.  In addition, as Czechoslovakia approached transition, it focused the majority of its 
repressive actions on a small number of opposition events.  Czechoslovakia’s transition was 
neither negotiated nor stolen, but is instead described as regime collapse.  The government 
believed up until the very end that it would be able to repress the increasing opposition 
activity.  By the time it realized that it could not, the power differentiation between the 
opposition and the regime was so great that the regime was unable to even negotiate. This 
resulted in a complete loss of power for the regime.   
 The Tier 3 cases presented in this study are Bulgaria and Romania, both of which 
experienced severe regime atmospheres and indirect paths to democracy.   In the case of 
Bulgaria, the international demonstration effect set both the opposition and the regime into 
action.  The opposition recognized the success of other regional popular mobilizations and 
subsequently responded to the destabilization of their own regime through mobilization.  The 
regime however, also learned from the experiences of other East European transitions.  
Instead of allowing the Bulgarian opposition to mature through the process of a completed 
mobilization-liberalization cycle, the regime made superficial changes to demobilize the 
opposition.  Instead of a negotiated transition, the regime stole the transition from the 
opposition and installed a new authoritarian order.   
 Romania represents the only case of violent insurrection.  The extreme regime 
severity of regime atmosphere did not allow for opposition mobilization.  Any such act was 
completely repressed.  In the case of Romania, the regime is conceptualized as one person: 
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Nicolae Ceauseşcu.  His style of dictatorship alienated the party, such that when instability 
occurred, they moved to usurp power.  The opposition was subsequently mobilized, but so 
unprepared that the members of the RCP easily assumed leadership under the guise of reform, 
in what has been termed a stolen revolution.  Due to the atmosphere of the pre-transition 
phase, Romania never developed a discernable pattern of opposition-regime interaction and 
its resulting path to democracy was indirect. 
 These case studies illuminate the relationship between regime atmosphere, the 
development and characteristics of a mobilization-liberalization cycle, and the maturity of the 
opposition.  The extent to which a mature opposition develops dictates the method of 
transition.  Countries that produced mature oppositions were most likely to experience a 
negotiated transition, and a democratic trajectory.  Conversely, in countries where the pre-
transition characteristics did not produce such an opposition, transitions were often stolen by 
the elites and an authoritarian trajectory followed.   
 I have shown that certain circumstances drive regimes to negotiate.  When the cost to 
repress an opposition exceeds the tolerable limits, a regime may opt to negotiate.  An 
opposition can gain the strength to meet this threshold of tolerance through a variant of the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle.  If their movement is incompletely repressed, or is 
responded to with liberalization, the opposition succeeds in increasing the cost of repression.  
A regime chooses to negotiate if it calculates that a compromise is its best chance at 
maintaining elements of power.  The cases of Hungary and Poland show this scenario.  Both 
countries negotiated with a strong opposition, but were able to maintain influence in the 
ensuing government.  The case of Czechoslovakia shows a situation where the regime 
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gambled that it could still control the opposition.  It refused to negotiate, and in doing so lost 
all of its power.  
 I have also shown that regimes that face immature oppositions are not driven to 
negotiate.  A viable opposition never materialized because the regime atmosphere was so 
severe in these countries.  Due to immature oppositions, transitions occurred later in these 
countries and were influenced by regional events.  The regimes effectively preempted the 
completion of a mobilization-liberalization cycle and made strategic moves to secure their 
own power.  Even though “roundtables” existed in these countries, the transition process 
does not provide evidence of a true negotiation and therefore these countries are examples of 
stolen transitions.  
 Despite the regional and chronological constraints of this investigation, my 
conclusions are relevant to present day world events, such as the case of Burma.   I have 
concluded that oppositions grow under mild regime atmospheres and mature through the 
mobilization-liberalization cycle of interaction.  This scenario often leads to a democratic 
trajectory for a given country.  This conclusion has potential foreign policy implications.  An 
opposition movement may be provided with political room to grow if an authoritarian regime 
is appropriately dissuaded from completely repressing acts of mobilization.  The ability of an 
opposition to mature through the process of regime interaction creates a higher probability of 
achieving democratic reform.  Therefore, a foreign policy that effectively discouraged 
complete repression subsequently provides political space for opposition movements.   
This thesis contributes to the body of literature on transition theory by identifying the 
underlying conditions that drive a regime to negotiate.  These factors are important not just to 
understanding why a regime chooses to negotiate, but also to understanding why some East 
  
 
129 
European countries transitioned to democracies and others remained authoritarian.  The same 
factors that contribute to negotiation are also related to trajectory.  While solving this puzzle 
was not my purpose, it nonetheless is intriguing and an investigation into this topic is 
naturally a next step in understanding transitions from communism. 
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APPENDIX A:  COMPARISON OF MOBLIZATION AND REPRESSION EVENTS 
  
 Table A-1 offers a comparison of mobilization and repression events across all case 
studies from 1987 to 1989.   
 
TABLE A-1:  Mobilization and Repression Events across Five Case Studies241 
1987 1988 1989 Country 
Mob.  
Events 
Rep. 
Events 
Mob.  
Events 
Rep.  
Events 
Mob. 
Events 
Rep. 
Events 
6 2 20 3 16 0 Hungary 
Repression: 33.3%  Repression: 15.0% Repression: 0.00% 
144 60 205 80 20 3 Poland
242
 
 
Repression: 41.6% Repression: 39.0% Repression: 15.0% 
12 9 21 19 92 54 Czecho-
slovakia
243
 
Repression: 75.0% Repression: 90.4% Repression: 58.7% 
1 0 1 4 37 6 Bulgaria 
Repression: 0.00% Repression: 400% Repression: 16.2% 
3 3 1 1 16 28 Romania 
Repression: 100% Repression: 100% Repression: 175% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
241
 The source of the event data for Table A-1 is Francisco, R. http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data.  This table 
represents the re-coded events of mobilization and repression in tabular form.   
 
242
 Two categories of events are excluded from the analysis of Poland.  These include events relating to Pope 
John Paul II’s 1987 visit to Poland and the 1988 election boycott. 
 
243
 Events associated with the 1985 visit by Pope John Paul II are excluded from the analysis of Czechoslovakia.   
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APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY 
PROCESS OF ORGANIZING EVENT DATA AND MULTIPLE-DATE ENTRIES 
 
 
For each event listed in the European Protest and Coercion Data set244, the following 
information is included:  event date, day of week, action, protestor, target, agent, event, 
country, location, issue, linked date, time, number of protestors, arrests, injuries, number of 
protestors killed, property damage, number of state participants, number of state injured, 
number of state killed, organizational strength to dissident strength, organizational strength to 
regime, source, and date of story.   
In deciding which events to include, I used the entries under the following categories:  
event date, action, protestor, target, agent, event, country, location, and number of protestors.  
I first considered the date of the event.  Many dates had multiple reports of events.  I 
consulted the action, protestor, target, agent, event, and location in order to decide whether to 
include multiple events that occurred on the same date.  If I could extrapolate from the 
remaining categories that each event was unique, it was included as a pertinent event.   
Events that lasted multiple days were counted as one event, unless 1.) The event 
description changed; 2.)  The location of the event changed; or, 3.) The number of 
participants in the event changed.  If either of these three situations occurred, the event 
counted as more than one event.  When determining events per month, if the duration of one 
event continued into the next month, the event was only counted in the first month of its 
duration.  Events with the same action, protestor, target, event description, and location 
reported on nonconsecutive dates were counted as multiple events.    
 
 
                                                 
244
 Francisco, R. http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/  
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APPENDIX C:  METHODOLOGY 
PROCESS OF RE-CODING EVENT DATA 
 
 Each event listed in the European Protest and Coercion Database245 is coded by action.  
The list of possible actions is available through the database website.  In re-coding the events, 
I considered only four possible labels for each event:  1.) Opposition Mobilization; 2.) 
Opposition Demobilization; 3.) Regime Concession; 4.) Regime Repression.  Using the 
codebook descriptions provided with the dataset, I categorized each possible action as one of 
these four actions.  Each event was then re-coded according to this method.  Not all events 
listed in the event data set were relevant to the new system of coding.  Non-pertinent events 
were not included in the tabulation of events or in the calculations or analyses involving 
events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
245
 Francisco, R. http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/ 
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APPENDIX D: METHODOLOGY 
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING EVENT DATA TO BE INCLUDED IN THIS THESIS 
 
 
Certain events within the European Protest and Coercion Database246 were considered 
non-pertinent events and were excluded from tabulation, calculation and analysis.  I 
systematically eliminated events that did not meet the following criteria:  1.) For each event, 
the actor must have been a resident of the country in question; 2.) For each mobilization 
event, the target must have been the state in question; 3.) For each mobilization event, the 
agent must have been incorporated as part of the country in question247; 4.) Any event which 
was motivated by ethnic nationalism was automatically excluded; 5.) Any event which was 
motivated by extremism248, and was not considered an oppositional mobilization was 
automatically excluded; 6.) Any repressive action had to affect the citizens of the country in 
question; and, 7.) All events must have taken place within the country in question . 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
246
 Francisco, R. http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/ 
 
247
 For example, if the agent of protest was the USSR, the event was not included in the tabulation, calculation, 
or analysis of events.   
 
248
 For example, extremist events such as airplane hijacking were excluded, regardless of actor or target, if it 
could be concluded from the event description that the event was an isolated occurrence and did not represent 
the same motivations as other opposition activity.   
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APPENDIX E: POLISH STATISTICS 1980-1981 
 Table A-2 depicts the mobilization statistics for Poland in 1980 and 1981.  This table 
should be used in comparison with the events of 1988 and 1989.   
TABLE A-2: Mobilization, Repression and Concession in Poland, 1980-1981249 
Year Mobilization 
Events 
Repression 
Events 
Concession 
Events 
Average 
Participation 
per 
Mobilization 
Event 
1980 131250 14 16 10,330.7 
First six 
months of 
1981 
120251 9 9 165,387.9 
Last six 
months of 
1981252 
274253 120 18 94,979.4 
 This table shows the increasing number of mobilization in 1980 and 1981.  Through 
the first six months of 1981, the regime did little to repress the movement.  In the last half of 
the year, however, repression increased until martial law was declared.  This effectively 
ended the period of mobilization.  The Polish opposition never again resurfaced as such a 
powerful force.  The peak average participation occurred during the first six months of 1981, 
with an average of 165,387 participants per event.  This is equivalent to .45 % of the  
                                                 
249
 The source of the event data for Table A-2 is Francisco, R. http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/.  This table 
represents the re-coded events of mobilization, repression, and concession in tabular form and includes a 
calculated average of participants per mobilization event. 
 
250
 Forty of these events represent two or more days of mobilization.  
 
251
 Thirty-two of these events represent two or more days of mobilization.   
 
252
 This table includes events through the declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981. 
 
253
 Seventy-eight of these events represent two or more days of mobilization. 
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APPENDIX E, CONTINUED: POLISH STATISTICS 1980-1981 
population, which is estimated at 36,062,309 in 1981254.  The table reveals that a pattern of 
interaction existed in 1980 and 1981 which served to mature the opposition.  For this reason, 
a protracted mobilization-liberalization cycle was not required in 1988 and 1989.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254
 Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, 
http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_PUBL_Demographic_yearbook_of_Poland_2007.pdf 
 
  
 
136 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York.  
Agh, A. 1998, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Edward 
Elgar, Northampton, MA.  
Bell, J.D. 1997, "Democratization and Political Participation in 'Postcommunist' Bulgaria" in 
Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, eds. K. Dawisha 
& B. Parrot, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 353-402.  
Bova, R. 1996, "Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: a Comparative 
Perspective" in Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, ed. N. Bermeo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 
113-138.  
Bozoki, A. 1993, "Hungary’s Road to Systemic Change: The Opposition Roundtable", East 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, pp. 276-308.  
Bradley, J.F.N. 1992, Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution :A Political Analysis, East 
European Monographs, Boulder.  
Bulgaria National Statistic Institute, Republic of Bulgaria 2008, , Comparative Tables by 
Census Years: Population by Residence and Sex. Available: 
http://www.nsi.bg.Census_e/SrTables.htm [2008, March 1] .  
Bunce, V. 2003, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist 
Experience", World Politics, vol. 55, pp. 167-192.  
CIA World Factbook. 1989, Czechoslovakia People-1989 Available: 
http://www.theodora.com/wfb1989/czechoslovakia/czechoslovakia_people/html  [2008, 
March 18].  
Davenport, C. 2007, State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Process, Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
di Palma, G. 1996, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in 
Eastern Europe" in Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, ed. N. Bermeo, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, .  
  
 
137 
Ekiert, G. 1991, "Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical 
Reconsideration", British Journal of Political Processes, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 285-313.  
Ekiert, G. 1997, "Rebellious Poles: Political Crisis and Popular Protest Under State 
Socialism, 1945-89", East European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, pp. 299-338.  
Ekiert, G. 1996, The State Against Society: Political Crises and their Aftermath in East 
Central Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
Fish, M.S. 1999, "Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East 
Europe and Eurasia", Slavic Review, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 794-823.  
Francisco, R.A. 1993, "Theories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989", American Journal 
of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 663-680.  
Francisco, R.A. , European Protest and Coercion Data. Available: 
http://www.web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/ [2008, February 15] .  
Freedom House 2007, , General Characteristics of Each Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Rating. Available: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=
333&year=2007 [2008, March 2] .  
Friedham, D.V. 1993, "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: 
Pact Making and Regime Collapse", East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 3, 
pp. 482-512.  
Garton Ash, T. 2002, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Garton Ash, T. 1993, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, 
Budapest, Berlin and Prague, Vintage Books, New York. 
Gedmin, J. 1992, The Hidden Hand :Gorbachev and the Collapse of East Germany, AEI 
Press, Washington, D.C.  
Gibney, M., Cornett, L. & Wood, R. 2006, , Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. Available: 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org [2008, February 20] .  
Glenn III, John K. 2001, Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern 
Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
  
 
138 
Goodwyn, L. 1991, Breaking the Barrier: The rise of Solidarity in Poland, Oxford 
University Press, New York.  
Gurr, T.R. & Lichbach, M.I. 1979, "Forecasting Domestic Political Conflict " in To Augur 
Well :Early Warning Indicators in World Politics, eds. J.D. Singer & M. Wallace, Sage 
Publications, Beverly Hills, pp. 153-194.  
Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R.R. 1997, "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions", 
Comparative Politics, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 263-283.  
Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2007, September 14, 2007-last update, Population 
Census 2001. Available: http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/06/00/tabeng [2008, 
March 1] .  
Institutul National de Statistica 1998-2007 2007, , Romanian Statistical Yearbook. Available: 
http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/ro/cap2/pdfMarch 1] .  
Kiraly, B.K. 1995, "Soft Dictatorship, Lawful Revolution and the Socialists' Return to 
Power" in Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94, eds. B.K. Kiraly & A. Bozoki, 
Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes, New Jersey, pp. 3-14.  
Kis, J. 1995, "Between Reform and Revolution: Three Hypotheses About the Nature of the 
Regime Change" in Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94, eds. B.K. Kiraly & A. 
Bozoki, Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes, New Jersey, pp. 33-60.  
Kolarova, R. & Dimitrov, D. 1996, "The Roundtable Talks in Bulgaria" in The Roundtable 
Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, ed. J. Elster, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp. 178-212.  
Krejci, J. & Machonin, P. 1996, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for Social Change, 
St. Martin's Press, New York.  
Lach, J. 2006, "The Political Economy in Hungary through Transition" in The Political 
Economy of Transition in Eurasia: Democratization and Economic Liberalization in a 
Global Economy, eds. N. Graham & F. Lindahl, Michigan State University Press, East 
Lansing, pp. 197-216.  
Linz, J.J. & Stepan, A.C. 1996, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation : 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore. 
  
 
139 
Maniu, M.T. 2006, "Why is Romania Different? A Perspective on the Economic Transition" 
in The Political Economy of Transition in Eurasia, eds. N. Graham & F. Lindahl, 
Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, pp. 237-254.  
McFaul, M. 2002, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative 
Transitions in the Postcommunist World", World Politics, vol. 54, pp. 212-244.  
Melone, A.P. 1994, "Bulgaria's National Roundtable Talks and the Politics of 
Accomodation", International Political Science Review, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 257-273.  
Osiatynski, W. 1996, "The Roundtable Talks in Poland" in The Roundtable Talks and the 
Breakdown of Communism, ed. J. Elster, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 
21-68.  
Przeworski, A. 1991, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, New York.  
Przeworski, A. 1986, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy " in 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, eds. G.A. O'Donnell, P.C. Schmitter & L. 
Whitehead, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 47-63.  
Rothschild, J. & Wingfield, N.M. 2000, Return to Diversity :A Political History of East 
Central Europe since World War II, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, New York.  
Rucht, D. et al. 1999. Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest,  Roman 
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, New York.  
Sanford, G. 1994, "Communism's Weakest Link-- Democratic Captialism's Greatest 
Challenge: Poland" in Building Democracy? The International Dimension of 
Democratisation in Eastern Europe, ed. Pridham, Geoffrey et al, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, pp. 188-217.  
Saxonberg, S. 2001, The Fall :A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, Harwood Academic, 
Amsterdam.  
Sharman, J.C. 2003, Repression and Resistance in Communist Europe, Routledge Curzon, 
New York.  
Scheimann, J.W. 2005, The Politics of Pact-making: Hungary’s Negotiated Transition to 
Democracy in Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
  
 
140 
Snyder, T. & Vachudova, M. 1996, "Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political 
Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989", East European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, 
no. 1, pp. 1-35.  
Swaminathan, S. 1999, "Time, Power, and Democratic Transitions", The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 178-191.  
Symynkywicz, J. 1996, 1989 :The Year the World Changed, 1st edn, Dillon Press, 
Parsippany, New Jersey.  
Tilly, C. 2000, "Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization", Sociological Theory, vol. 
18, no. 1, pp. 1-16.  
Tismaneanu, V. 1993, "The Quasi-Revolution and Its Discontents: Emerging Political 
Pluralism in Post-Ceausescu Romania", East European Politics and Societies, vol. 7, no. 
2, pp. 309-348.  
Tismaneanu, V. 1989, "Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania", Government and 
Opposition, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 177-198.  
Tokes, R.L. 2000, ""Transitology”: Global Dreams and Post-Communist Realities", Central 
Europe Review, [Online], vol. 2, no. 10, pp. March 5, 2008. Available from: 
http://www.ce-review.org/00/10/tokes10.html.  
Vachudova, M.A. 2005, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after 
Communism, Oxford University Press, New York.   
Welsh, H.A. 1994, "Political Processes in Central and Eastern Europe", Comparative 
Politics, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 379-394.  
Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych. 2007. Demographic Yearbook of Poland. Available: 
http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_PUBL_Demographic_yearbook_of_Pol
and_2007.pdf  [2008, March 01]. 
 
 
 
